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NEWSPAPER MONOPOLY IN NEW ORLEANS:
THE LESSONS FOR ANTITRUST POLICY
Richard J. Barber*
Within the past fifty years the United States has witnessed
the disappearance, primarily through consolidation, of more
than 800 daily newspapers. As a result many cities no longer
have a daily paper at all. And of those that do only about 4%
(the comparable figure in 1910 was 43%) have as many as
two competing publishers; New York, Washington, and Boston
have three or more local newspaper contestants; another 55
cities, including Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Detroit,
Houston, and San Francisco, have just two publishers ;1 and the
rest 2 live under the influence of a single voice, 3 benevolent or
otherwise. Whether this trend to newspaper monopoly at the
local level will have the serious adverse long-run social implica-
tions that many foresee cannot now be determined, of course;'
*Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. Some of the
material in this article is based on interviews conducted by the author in New
Orleans. For his aid in the later stages of the article's preparation the author
acknowledges the assistance of Wallace M. Swanson, a member of the Southern
Methodist University Law School's class of 1965.
1. Although Chicago and Philadelphia have more than two papers, each has
only two publishers. In Chicago the Sun-Times owns the Daily News, and the
Tribune owns the American. (The Tribune also controls the New York Daily
News, the nation's largest paper in terms of circulation.) In Philadelphia the
Inquirer also publishes the News. Los Angeles and Detroit each have only two
publishers and only two papers. The source for this information and for statis-
tics and other material dealing with American newspapers is EDITOR & PUBLISH-
ER, 1963 INTERNATIONAL YEAR BOOK [hereinafter cited as E&P YEAR BOOK].
2. Cities with a single newspaper publisher include such large communities as
Milwaukee (1960 population: 741,324), San Diego (573,000), Cincinnati (503,-
000), Memphis (498,000), Atlanta (487,000), Minneapolis (483,000), and Kansas
City (476,000) -in addition to New Orleans (627,000), the country's fifteenth
largest city. 1963 E&P YEAR BOOK; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 22-23 (84th ed. 1963).
3. ERNST, THE FIRST FREEDOM 279 (1946) [hereinafter cited as ERNST];
LEE, THE DAILY NEWSPAIER IN AMERICA (1937) [hereinafter cited as LEE];
Nixon, Concentration and Absenteeism in Daily Newspaper Ownership, 22 JOUR-
NALISM Q. 97 (1945). Generally, VILLARD, THE DISA'PEAING DAILY (1944).
4. Empirically we know little about the effects of the mass media; Klapper,
What We Know About the Effects of Mass Communications: The Brink of Hope,
21 PUB. OPINION Q. 453 (1957). And even less about the relative merits of com-
petitive versus non-competitive papers; Bigman, Rivals in Conformity: A Study
of Two Competing Dailies, 25 JOURNALISM Q. 127 (1948) ; Borstel, Ownership,
Competition, and Comment in 20 Small Dailies, 33 JOURNALISM Q. 220 (1956) ;
Nixon & Jones, The Content of Non-Competitive vs. Competitive Newspapers, 33
JOURNALISM Q. 299 (1956) ; Willoughby, Are Two Competing Dailies Necessarily
Better Than One?, 32 JOURNALISM Q. 197 (1955). Still, though, there is sub-
stantial appeal in the argument that the less concentrated is ownership control
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but there is a legitimate basis for concern. Although there are
sources of information and ideas aside from the newspapers
(thank goodness), mere day-to-day observation suggests that
the other mass media are far from perfect substitutes either in
the ways of propagandization or in the detailed reporting of
public affairs, particularly of the provincial variety. 5 Certainly
there would appear to be distinct social advantage in preserving
as many independent, competing newspapers as are economical-
ly viable - and perhaps more.
Since the decline of competition in the newspaper industry
typically takes the form of outright combinations between com-
peting publishers, one would think that antitrust intervention
could play an important role in retarding the growth of mo-
nopoly. Within only the last few years publishers in Chicago,
Detroit, Washington, Cincinnati, Milwaukee, and New Orleans
have merged with or purchased a competing concern, in what
appear to be essentially mergers for monopoly.6 To an intelli-
gent observer this sort of conduct would seem made to order
for antitrust action, fitting into numerous statutory slots, most
notably section 7 of the Clayton Act. Yet examination of the
record reveals that the federal enforcement agencies have been
little concerned with the newspaper industry. The Department
of Justice has initiated very few proceedings involving news-
papers at all (the Federal Trade Commission has been mute) ;
none have been brought under section 7 (although a number of
mergers and acquisitions have taken place since the enactment
of the Celler-Kefauver amendment of 1950), nor have any been
commenced solely on the theory that a newspaper has monop-
of the various media the greater the opportunity for diverse ideas to be expressed
in a meaningful fashion. On other aspects of the monopoly problem see Bird,
Newspaper Monopoly and Political Independence, 17 JOURNALISM Q. 207 (1940)
and ERNST ch. IV.
5. Moreover, there is a substantial degree of cross-ownership between the
media, especially between newspapers and radio-television. In 1958 a third of the
country's television stations were affiliated with newspapers, most in the same
market areas. Levin, Broadcast Regulation and Intermedium Competition, 45
VIROINIA L. REV. 1104, 1136 (1959). Even if radio is taken into account the
extent of common ownership is disturbingly large. A recent survey by the Amer-
ican Newspaper Publishers Association revealed that in 1960, of 1,461 cities with
one or more daily papers, in 355 (almost 25%) there was only one independent
"media voice." N.Y. Times, March 15, 1963, p. 4, col. 1-3 (city ed.). Even in
larger communities newspaper ownership of broadcasting media can greatly re-
strict free media access. In Dallas, for example, the city's two daily papers each
control a local major network-affiliated radio-TV complex. For figures and ref-
erences as of an earlier date on the problem, see Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1342 (1950).
6. Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, 40 Am. EcoN. REV.: PAPERS
AND PROCEEDINGS 23 (1950).
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olized in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.7 Rather the
prosecutions undertaken have been devoted entirely to allega-
tions of improper market conduct - to practices that are felt
likely to permit one firm to enlarge its position unfairly at the
expense of a rival. This emphasis on behavior as distinct from
position is a hallmark of contemporary antitrust enforcement.8
Especially in the case of newspaper publication there prevails
among enforcement authorities the implicit belief that if cer-
tain illicit exclusionary practices are ended, normal market
forces will function in an acceptable fashion. In this view the
real culprit is exclusionary conduct; if ended, workable com-
petition will prevail - meaning, presumably, that most cities
will have at least two contesting publishers. Whether this is
true, however, remains open to serious question, for if news-
paper monopoly is fundamentally the product of technological
and market forces, focusing attention on specific practices can
represent a waste of limited enforcement resources. Moreover,
if the real cause is an imbalance between the economics of, news-
paper publication and the size of most of the markets, antitrust
relief will then provide no real solution at all.
To assess rationally the role of antitrust policy in the news-
paper industry we need a good deal more information about
the functioning of local newspaper markets and the impact of
past antitrust activity. For this purpose New Orleans provides
7. In addition to the Times-Picayune litigation, Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), reversing United States v. Times-
Picayune Publishing Co., 105 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. La. 1952), the Department of
Justice has initiated two other cases, one involving the Kansas City Star, the
other the Wichita Eagle, on the theory that the use of forced combination rates
(i.e., requiring advertisers to take space in the publisher's morning and afternoon
papers) restrained trade and represented an attempt to monopolize. The Kansas
City Star, after a long fight, lost its battle, the courts finding that the facts were
distinguishable from those at issue in Times-Picayune. Kansas City Star Co. v.
United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957).
The Wichita Eagle consented to terminate the practice. United States v. Wichita
Eagle Publishing Co., 1959 Trade Cas. 69,400 (D. Kan. 1959) (consent decree).
In three other cases the government alleged the use of overt exclusionary tactics:
One was dismissed by the trial court, United States v. Harte-Hanks Newspapers,
Inc., 170 F. Supp. 227 (N.D. Texas 1959) ; in another the defendant agreed to
terminate the conduct which inspired the suit, United States v. Mansfield Jour-
nal Co., 1959 Trade Cas. 67,210 (N.D. Ohio 1952) (consent decree) ; and in the
third, involving the Lorain (Ohio) Journal, the Supreme Court affirmed a con-
viction, the facts revealing a manifestly abusive use of power: The Journal, the
only paper in Lorain, systematically boycotted any advertiser who employed the
services of a new radio station that had located in the city. Quite properly, this
was found to violate the Sherman Act. United States v. Lorain Journal Co., 92
F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1950), aff'd per curiam, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
8. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 508-18, 539 (1959) ; Director & Levi,
Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U.L. Rav. 281 (1956) ; Levi, A
Two-Level Anti-Monopoly Law, 47 NW. U.L. Rav. 567 (1952).
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the basis for an ideal case-study. Generally typical of news-
paper publication elsewhere in the country, New Orleans has
also been the setting for one of the few antitrust cases brought
against a newspaper - resulting in a decision commonly viewed
as one of the most important handed down by the Supreme
Court in recent years. Not only does this render the New Or-
leans market an apt candidate for inspection, but the massive
trial record assembled during the litigation makes publicly
available detailed factual information of a kind that otherwise
would be largely unobtainable (no industry more jealously
guards the secrecy of its operations than newspapers). This
article, therefore, purports (1) to review the principal struc-
tural and performance characteristics of newspaper publication
in New Orleans; (2) to survey the nature of the relevant anti-
trust litigation; (3) to analyze the merit of the government's
action, directed as it was exclusively to certain practices in
which the city's leading newspaper engaged; and (4) to con-
sider the role of antitrust policy generally in the newspaper
industry. Most of the discussion deals with the period 1949 to
1958, with particular emphasis on the years 1949 and 1950
since they were at the heart of the pertinent antitrust litigation
and exemplify the market's outstanding features over the past
thirty years.
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW ORLEANS
NEWSPAPER MARKET
Most observers would probably characterize the New Or-
leans newspaper market during any of the past thirty years -
if not over an even longer period of time - as unworkably
competitive.9 The number of sellers has been few, product dif-
9. Recognizing that few industrial markets display the characteristics of pure
or perfect competition, various commentators have endeavored to define criteria
of acceptable or "workable" or "effective" competition. J. M. Clark was probably
the first to use the term "workable competition." Toward a Concept of Work-
able Competition, 30 AMER. EcoN. REV.: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 241, 243
(1940). [The underlying notion, however, can be traced into classic economic
theory. See Peterson, Antitrust and the Classic Model, 47 AMER. EcoN. REV. 60
(1957).] During the last 20 years or so a number of other writers have elab-
orated on their own tests of acceptable competition. See, e.g., Stigler, The Extent
and Bases of Monopoly, 32 AMER. EcON. REV.: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 2-3
(1942); EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 9, 10 (1949). The numerous ap-
proaches have been surveyed in Mason, The Current Status of the Monopoly Prob-
lem in the United States, 62 HAv. L. REV. 1265, 1266-71 (1949). As he sums it
up, "workable competition is considered to require, principally, a fairly large num-
ber of sellers and buyers, no one of whom occupies a large share of the market,
the absence of collusion among either group, and the possibility of market entry
[Vol. XXIV
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ferentiation intense, entry effectively impeded. Particularly
striking is the role of the Times-Picayune Company, the mar-
ket's dominant participant, and today its only daily newspaper
publisher; quite properly it is the center of attention, and will
be so treated throughout the remainder of this article. A study
of its behavior offers convincing evidence of its monopoly posi-
tion; and an examination of its performance provides little in
the way of mitigation: it has manifested substantial excess
capacity, it has earned supernormal profits, and it has engaged
in price behavior of the kind commonly associated with mo-
nopoly. For many purposes such a thumbnail sketch might be
sufficient; but since the company was the target of the govern-
ment's 1950 antitrust litigation (the topic of Part II) and since
its behavior so well illustrates the economic attributes of news-
paper publication generally, its traits, and those of the market
in which it functioned, must be elaborated somewhat more fully.
The Market's Structural Development
Of the dozen or so English-language daily newspapers that
began publication in New Orleans during the nineteenth cen-
tury, the great majority- bearing names like the Chronicle,
the Bulletin, the Republican, the Crescent, the Delta, the Tropic,
and the Bee- have long since vanished from the scene. 10 But
the oldest of them, the Picayune, founded on January 25, 1837,
remains to the present, though in diluted form. And some of
the others can also be traced to more recent days, as with the
Times (founded in 1863), the Democrat (1875), the Item
(1877)," and the States (1880).
by new firms." Id. at 1268. Certainly the New Orleans market has long been
distinguished by a very few sellers, two after 1933, one since 1958, and by ex-
tremely high barriers to entry (which no one has attempted to surmount for sev-
eral decades). Regardless of the type of workable competition defined it would
be difficult to place this market within its bounds.
10. LEE; MoTT, AMERICAN JOURNALISM: A HISTORY 1690-1960, 249-50 (3d
ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as MoTr].
11. During the nineteenth century, newspapers in New Orleans appear to
have been started, or purchased, as much for political reasons as for traditional
economic motives. In 1897, for instance, one Dominick O'Malley purchased the
Item for the avowed purpose of raising "some hell." That he did. He published
many libelous cartoons, some with skunks bearing the faces of his enemies;
engaged in a number of gun fights with those who criticized his efforts; and
uncovered several scandals. The paper's circulation rose enormously. O'Malley,
it might be noted, had a history of colorful exploits. In 1895 he was arrested,
along with a number of others, for the murder of the New Orleans police chief.
All were placed on trial, and acquitted. Rumors that the jurors had been bribed
spread; the townspeople became aroused, organized into a mob, found all of the
defendants except O'Malley and proceeded to hang them. The imperturbable
1964]
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In sharp contrast to the market's rapid development during
the half-century beginning in the 1830's, the years since 1880
are marked by both the total absence of new entrants (a condi-
tion generally true throughout the country, though elsewhere
the decline in entry did not become noticeable until the early
1900's) 12 and the gradual consolidation of the older papers. The
Times and the Democrat joined in 1881, and then in 1914 the
resulting Times-Democrat merged with the Picayune. Nineteen
years later the now Times-Picayune purchased the States -
which it continued in circulation as its afternoon paper. Mean-
while, in 1924, the Item had commenced publication of a morn-
ing paper known as the Tribune;13 this continued until 1940
when it was discontinued. After the demise of the Tribune the
market's contours took the shape they presented until 1958,
when the Item was purchased by the rival Times-Picayune Com-
pany. In the years 1940-1958 (the period of principal concern
here, in large part because it encompasses the relevant antitrust
litigation involving the Times-Picayune Company) New Or-
leans newspaper publication was thus in the hands of a duopoly:
the Item Company published a daily afternoon paper and, from
March 4, 1950, until 1958, a Sunday edition; the Times-Picayune
Company published the city's only morning paper, the Times-
Picayune, and the other of its two afternoon papers, the States,
as well as a single Sunday edition. So sets the stage.
Of the three newspapers published in New Orleans between
1940 and 1958 - namely, the Item, the States, and the Times-
Picayune - clearly the Times-Picayune was dominant. While
advertisers, who provide 70% or more of a newspaper's rev-
enue, 14 treated the two afternoon papers, the Item and the
O'Malley left the city for a short time, returning in 1897 to purchase the Item.
TINKER, Two-GUN JOURNALISM IN NEW ORLEANS (1952).
12. In the country as a whole the number of newspapers continued to swell
until 1909, when 2,600 were being published. The nineteenth century, however,
witnessed the beginnings of most of the daily papers: In 1800 there were but
24 dailies, by 1850 the number had increased to 254, and by 1899 to 2,226. As
the New Orleans experience would suggest, the most rapid growth occurred
between 1870 and the late 1880's. ERNST, ch. IV and exhibits A-F; LEE; MOTT.
13. One attribute of newspaper publication, observable in the strategies of
both the Times-Picayune (in buying and perpetuating the afternoon States) and
the Item (starting the morning Tribune), is the desire of publishers to make
fuller use of their available productive capacity by adding a second paper, cir-
culated at another hour of the day. As well, a second paper represents one more
non-price weapon in the arsenal of the oligopoly seller.
14. Advertisers, who typically provide 70% or more of a newspaper's revenue,
are customarily divided into three categories: retail (e.g., a local department
store), which in 1950 provided about 50% of the Times-Picayune Company's
total linage; classified; and national or general (e.g., a cigarette manufacturer),
which in 1950 amounted to about 15% of the company's linage. The implica-
[Vol. XXIV
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States, as highly substitutable, they almost universally regarded
the morning paper, because of its far greater circulation, as
essential to successful merchandising in the metropolitan mar-
ket. This explains why in 1949 the Times-Picayune, in spite of
its significantly higher advertising rates, carried nearly as
much advertising linage as the other two papers combined. 15
Possessing a great lead in circulation it was simply able to offer
more readers per unit of advertising expenditure than either of
the other papers; in 1949 its average daily circulation of 170,000
was almost equal to the total circulation of the afternoon papers,
or in absolute terms exceeded each of them by more than 80,000.
Even if allowance is made for the reader duplication that ad-
mittedly existed, the morning paper still provided a great many
additional readers.
Thus for the typical advertiser, seeking the largest attain-
able audience, no other paper in New Orleans was an adequate
substitute for the Times-Picayune. For some admittedly this
was less true than others; to an advertiser, for example, inter-
ested chiefly in coverage within the city of New Orleans itself,
the geographic pattern of the Times-Picayune circulation, with
only 65% of its sales in the city zone as compared with 80%
for either of the other papers, 16 made it somewhat less attrac-
tive. Yet even allowing for this the Times-Picayune still reached
far more people, whether within the city zone or in a larger
area, than either the States or the Item. Moreover, it did so at
a significantly lower advertising cost per reader; it is this
feature, reflecting the interaction of advertising rates and cir-
culation, that assumes major consequence in newspaper sur-
vival. Advertising charges tend generally to increase much
tions of newspapers' peculiar economic posture, involving the sale of one product
to two groups of buyers (readers and advertisers), has been considered in Corden,
The Ma.Timisation of Profit by a Newspaper, 20 REV. EcoN. STUD. 181 (1953)
and in KALDOR & SILVERMAN, A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF ADVERTISING EXPEND-
ITURE AND OF THE REVENUE OF THE PRESS (National Institute of Economic
and Social Research: Economic and Social Studies, vol. VIII, 1948). The com-
panion problem of pricing with interrelated costs and demands has been con-
sidered in Coase, Monopoly Pricing with Interrelated Costs and Demands, 13
ECONOMICA (n.s.) 278 (1946).
15. 88 MEDIA RECORDS 65 (1949). As a point of information, there are 300
agate lines per column, or 2,400 lines per page, in the usual full-size (e.g., New
York Times) newspaper. In 1949 the daily issues of the Times-Picayune carried
23,149,021 lines of advertising of all types. Together the Item and the States
carried 25,573,956 lines (of which the Item had 13,788,845). This condition sub-
sisted until 1953, when the Times-Picayune began carrying more linage than the
two afternoon papers. Ibid.; 104 MEDIA RECORDS 72 (1953).
16. The "City Zone" included all of Orleans Parish (coextensive with the
city of New Orleans) and part of Jefferson and St. Bernard Parishes; its 1949
1964]
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less rapidly than circulation, with the result that newspapers
with greater sales usually are a far more attractive medium
than newspapers with a smaller audience, in spite of absolute
differences in their advertising charges.17
The Times-Picayune Company, fully aware that the Times-
Picayune was, as it put it, "the backbone of any advertising ef-
fort in this market, 1 8 pursued a deliberate policy calculated to
preserve its distinctiveness from the afternoon papers. In many
unnecessary and expensive ways it operated the States and the
Times-Picayune as separate entities. Each had its own news
staff, acting under the direction of an independent editor.'9
Different syndicated material was purchased for the two papers
(Li'l Abner and Walter Winchell, for example, were carried
only in the States, except on Sunday when they appeared in the
Times-Picayune) .2o Many kinds of news inherently of no great
immediacy and which could just as well have been run in both
papers without change, such as pictures of brides and the newly
engaged, were handled separately.21 Although it could easily
have combined its operation and published simply in the form
of an "all-day" or "round-the-clock" paper, it chose not to do
So. 22 Rather the company consistently varied content and pre-
served largely sovereign editorial organizations for the primary
population was 540,030. A larger "Retail Trading Zone" encompassed a number
of parishes adjacent to the city containing another 385,094 persons. Only about
65% of the Times-Picayune circulation fell within the city zone, as compared
with 80% for the States and 82% for the Item. These data represent the circu-
lation characteristics of all editions for each paper; if, however, specific press
runs are considered, a different picture emerges, for some of the morning paper's
press runs were circulated largely within the city proper and some of the after-
noon papers' press runs were distributed in outlying areas. Calculated from data
in Government Exhibit Nos. [hereinafter cited as GX] 146-48, 155-56, Records,
1494-1549, 1575-1622, United States v. Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 105 F.
Supp. 670 (E.D. La. 1952) [hereinafter cited as Record].
17. BORDEN, TAYLOR & HOVDE, NATIONAL ADVERTISING IN NEWSPAPERS 440-
41 (1946); Malone, Economic-Technological Bases for Newspaper Diversity, 28
JOURNALISM Q. 315 (1951).
18. GX 17, Record 1303.
19. Record 194, 1304. Some local reporters represented both papers, as in
the case of those covering the courts and the sugar and coffee markets, id. at 613,
but this was the exception rather than the rule. Editorially, though, the view-
points of the two papers were coordinated; they supported "the same major move-
ment, the same major political activities, and the same candidates." Id. at 614.
20. GX 119, 122, Record 621-25.
21. GX 43, Record 1351-52. The States "published the pictures of brides and
in many cases brides and grooms who were good wholesome citizens but not
necessarily of the 400." Ibid.
22. Technically, for a paper to qualify as an "all-day" publication "there
must be no difference in editions which would enable anyone to distinguish be-
tween them being the editions of a morning or an evening paper (save by the
insertion of later news)." Chapter C, II(f) of the By-Laws and Rules of the
Audit Bureau of Circulation, Record 617.
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purpose of presenting distinguishable papers. The States was
tailored for the "great middle classes" while the Times-Picayune
image was that of a less sensational, more comprehensive news
journal. Or, as one of its advertising executives put it, the make-
up of the two papers was "as different as the New York Times
and the New York Journal-American." 2 Unquestionably the
city's three papers were distinct products from the readers' point
of view, and among them the Times-Picayune was dominant,
while as between the States and the Item there was considerable
demand and cross-elasticity.
Excess Capacity and Production Cost Characteristics
One of the most common characteristics of newspaper pub-
lication, large excess capacity, is well typified by the Times-
Picayune Company.2 4 In 1950 (and the point is still true) it
printed both of its papers in the same six-story brick structure
on Lafayette Square, and with the identical equipment, just as
it had been doing since 1933 when it purchased the States.2 5 Its
large excess capacity was traceable to the full array of printing
equipment; but it is illustrated by the presses, which in the ag-
gregate (and in terms of original cost, an admittedly unsatis-
factory but still suggestive guide) made up about 61% of the
total acquisition costs for all of the company's equipment.26
Four in number, one color and three black-and-white, the press-
es were rarely fully used- even during the actual printing of
a given edition; indeed they were idle from 70-75% of the time.2 7
Only one of the three black-and-white presses was in general
use, the other two being considered supplementary and operated
only during peak demand periods; the one color press was used
even less intensively- normally only in connection with the
printing of the Sunday paper. And what was true of the Times-
23. GX 17, Record 1304.
24. Malone, Economic-Technological Bases for Newspaper Diversity, 28
JOURNALISM Q. 315 (1951) ; Ray, Economic Forces as Factors in Daily News-
paper Concentration, 29 JOURNALISM Q. 31 (1952).
25. GX 144, Record 1486.
26. Defendant's Exhibit No. [hereinafter cited as DX] 6, Record 1626. The
composing room, with 35 linotype machines, made up another 16% of the com-
pany's original capital investment in equipment. No other single department
represented more than 5% of the total.
27. Depending on their capacity, of course, a paper's presses seldom will be
in operation for more than about two hours a day if only one paper is being
published. Some material can be printed before the hour of circulation, but the
late breaking news (e.g., the stockmarket quotations) must be composed and
printed within a short time after its receipt. And in large measure the presses
are designed so as to permit very rapid printing of such close-deadline items-a
fact that dictates very large excess capacity.
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Picayune Company was even more true of the Item Company,
which had its own presses and other requisite equipment - used
only in the printing of one paper a day as compared with the
two being printed by its rival. Perhaps the best proof of the
extent of the excess printing capacity is to be found in the fact
that as each paper in New Orleans was swallowed by one of its
adversaries, including the acquisition of the Item in 1958, the
buyer sold the plant and equipment which had been purchased
and merely transferred the production function to its own exist-
ing facilities.
Closely related to the question of excess capacity is the de-
clining nature of the cost schedule over the relevant range, re-
flecting the comparatively small incremental expense incurred
in the printing of an additional paper once unavoidable prelim-
inary typographical operations have been performed. Before
any newspaper (or other matter, of course) can be printed the
copy must be set in type and the plates which are to be placed
on the presses actually prepared. This is a costly process, par-
ticularly in terms of labor. In 1950, out of a total of 953 em-
ployees carried on the Times-Picayune Company's payroll, 172
were employed in the composing room alone- more than the
total number on the editorial force.28 Typographical personnel
pay scales were also high, amounting to an average of $2.25 per
hour in 1949, the highest hourly compensation of any production
workers (and higher on an hourly basis than the wages of most
editorial employees) .29 As a share of the company's operating
costs, expenditures for the composing, stereotype, and photo en-
graving activities made up 13% of the total, or about the same
as the share allocable to the editorial function.80 All told, ex-
penses for typographical work and other duties that are largely
unrelated to output made up an estimated 40% of total operat-
ing costs. Of those expenses which could be expected to vary
with output, the most important was for newsprint- itself
representing about 42% of the total.8 1
Roughly speaking, therefore, about half of all operating
costs varied directly with output, the other half remaining
largely constant regardless of the number of newspapers print-
28. DX 5, Record 1626.
29. 1951 E&P YEAR3 BOOK 290.
30. GX 8, schedule 1, Record 1288C, 1292.
31. All of these data relate to 1948, with the respective dollar amounts being
taken from GX 8, schedule 1, Record ibid. The percentages have been calculated.
[Vol. XXIV
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ed. If the very large fixed costs, particularly those incurred for
the purchase of capital equipment, were also taken into account,
there would seem little doubt but that the average unit cost
curve would descend sharply over a sizable output range and
continue to decline beyond the output level attained by the
Times-Picayune Company. 2
Price Behavior
The Times-Picayune Company's pricing behavior has long
reflected its substantial power over price, and indeed is the
strongest evidence of its preeminent market stature. Its price
decisions have represented a shrewd evaluation of occasional
variations in its market strength: as from time to time it be-
came stronger it typically raised advertising rates, in an obvious
quest for profit maximization; and when its status was directly
questioned it took on the guise of a quasi-competitive seller,
cutting prices (but hardly to the likely competitive level) and
seeking to exert its influence in such a way as to frustrate the
actual or anticipated challenge. In 1941, for example, when the
Item's Sunday publication was suspended, thus giving the
Times-Picayune Company an exclusive hold on that submarket,
it promptly hiked advertising rates by nearly 8% in most cate-
gories; by comparison it made no change in the weekday rates,
where the Item still presented direct competition. 33 Again, in
1943, it repeated this action, raising Sunday rates but not week-
day rates. Finally in 1958, when the company gained a solitary
grip on the entire market through outright purchase of the
Item, it immediately increased prices -this time by nearly
30% .34
While the company clearly has reflected a strong monopo-
listic propensity to raise prices when it attained an unchallenged
market position, at times it has also manifested a willingness
to cut rates when its leadership was jeopardized. In 1950, for
example, the Item, then under new ownership, announced that
it would begin publication of a Sunday edition. This represented
a challenge to the Times-Picayune's grip on the Sunday market
32. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of others who have studied
the problem generally. See note 24 supra.
33. GX 88-89, Record 1404-05.
34. Judged by a comparison of Times-Picayune/States general advertising
rates in effect January 15, 1958, with those in effect on November 15, 1958.
NEWSPAPER RATES AND DATA 296-99 (Jan. 15, 1958) ; id. at 314-15 (Jan. 15,
1959).
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and one which it greeted with imminent distaste ;35 immediately
it adjusted its general advertising rates- seemingly in a way
calculated to make use of its morning paper's strong position,
but nevertheless amounting to a significant advertising rate
concession. Previously the company had offered no combination
rates for space taken in the Sunday paper and either its morn-
ing or its afternoon paper. For example, according to the rate
schedule which had been placed in effect in July 1949, the
open line rate on general advertising in the Sunday edition was
60¢; for comparison, the morning rate at the time was 40¢, the
evening rate 24¢, and the optional morning-evening combine
56¢.36 But on February 1, 1950, just one month before the emer-
gence of the new Sunday Item, the Times-Picayune Company
inaugurated an optional combined rate on general advertising
that encompassed the Sunday edition.37 If copy were inserted
in the Sunday paper and in the States, the open line rate was
now 78¢ (previously the total of the separate rates was 84¢) ;
for insertion in the Sunday paper and in the morning Times-
Picayune the rate became 94¢ per line as contrasted with the
previous $1.00.
The threat of competition in the Sunday field thus led to
prompt price reductions, a fact which itself is consistent with
the postulates concerning likely monopoly price behavior. On
the other hand, when the company possessed exclusive control
in the Sunday field it no doubt priced higher than it would have
even under imperfectly competitive circumstances. Yet the way
in which it adjusted to the Item's entry reveals something else
about the company's conduct: it was not only hostile to any
further entry, but it sought to use the attraction - nay, power
- of its morning paper as a device for perpetuating its domi-
nance in the Sunday field and for maintaining position in the
afternoon field. However, like any monopolist its power was
not uniform in all sectors; it confronted not one demand
schedule, but several - and it altered its pricing tactics accord-
ingly.
35. When he learned of the Item's plan to reinstitute a Sunday edition one
Times-Picayune Company executive said, "[T]here is no necessity for another
Sunday paper in New Orleans and the plan of the Item to enter the Sunday field
is not economic from the standpoint of the reader and the advertiser, and
we consider their doing so an infringement on a franchise which we believe
belongs to us." Record 1348.
36. GX 29, Record 1325.
37. GX 34, Record 1340.
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This ability to discriminate in price between buyers in ac-
cordance with their unequal demand elasticities is, of course, a
well-recognized symptom of monopoly,38 and one clearly dis-
cernible in the behavior of the Times-Picayune Company. Here
it is particularly noticeable in a comparison of the treatment
accorded general (national) advertisers and retail advertisers.
While there are some distinctions between them which might in
part rationalize their dissimilar treatment along other lines, the
basic explanation appears to lie in the slope of their demand
schedules, with this inference tending to be confirmed by their
actual response to price changes. Like all newspapers the Times-
Picayune Company charged national advertisers substantially
higher prices for the same physical product than retail adver-
tisers.3 9 In 1950, 2,500 lines (roughly one full page) of basically
identical advertising copy acclaiming the merits of a given
product, for instance, cost from 25 to 40% less if placed by a
local department store than if directly inserted by the manu-
facturer. 40 Moreover, general advertisers, beginning in 1950,
were subjected to the unit rule (i.e., were required to place copy
in both the Times-Picayune and the States) while retail adver-
tisers were not. This not only meant a loss in their freedom
to choose from among the media, but, more importantly, rep-
resented a very large effective rate increase to the national
advertiser wishing only to use the Times-Picayune. It provoked
diverse protests; yet in spite of the unit rules invocation in
1950, the Times-Picayune carried 2,964,420 lines of general ad-
vertising, down only slightly from the 3,038,200 lines it carried
in 1949.41
Entry Factors
As has been noted earlier New Orleans daily newspaper
publication has been distinguished by a dearth of entry for more
than eighty years. Many explanations can be offered. Some
stem from the technological characteristics of the relevant pro-
duction process which indicate the presence of a declining cost
schedule over the observed output range; others are traceable
38. STIGLER, TIIR THEORY OF PRICE 214-18 (rev. ed. 1952).
39. BORDEN, TAYLOR & HOVDE, NATIONAL ADVERTISING IN NEWPAPERS 436-
40 (1946) ; FERGUSON, THE ADVERTISING RATE STRUCTURE IN THE DAILY NEWS-
PAPER INDUSTRY (1963).
40. In the Times-Picayune the cost per line of such an advertisement was
250 to retail advertisers, 400 to national advertisers; in the States the comparable
charges were 17-I/L4 and 240.
41. 92 MEDIA. RECORDS 65 (1950).
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to the propensity of advertisers, who provide the preponderance
of a paper's revenue, to gain as many readers as possible per
unit of outlay. These natural or market-induced forces will be
considered further in Part III.
However, New Orleans newspaper publication also has in-
volved certain artificial entry impediments that merit comment.
For instance, when the Times-Picayune Company purchased the
Item in 1958, it acquired and then immediately sold the seller's
plant and equipment - the equipment being disposed of in such
a way that it would be unavailable to any prospective local
entrant. Moreover, the company also secured from the Item's
former owner, and from the Item's principal editors, covenants
that they would not reenter the business of newspaper publica-
tion in New Orleans for at least five years.42 While these two
features of the 1958 sale did not necessarily prevent entry, they
made it considerably more difficult by removing from the
market both locally experienced managerial talent and, more
importantly, used equipment of the necessary types. While new
equipment was obtainable, the price barrier it presented was
sufficiently high so as effectively to deter entry, especially in
the light of all the other unfavorable circumstances.
A similar artificial barrier was erected in 1941 in respect
to Sunday publication. In the spring of that year the Item,
then publisher of the city's only other paper, was in debt to
the International Paper Company in the amount of $100,000 -
a sum accumulated over several depression years. When it was
unable to meet a firm demand for payment, International took
42. EDITOR AND PUBLISHER, July 19, 1958, p. 9. Such restrictive trade
covenants are a commonplace in the newspaper industry. In 1938, for example,
when Paul Block, then publisher of the Toledo Blade, bought out his only rival,
the Toledo News-Bee, the selling organization agreed that it would not resume
publication of a paper in the city for ten years. The Toledo Blade Co. v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 11 T.C. 1079, 1083-84 (1948). Interestingly, of
the $880,000 purchase price the contract of sale valued the covenant at $780,000.
A similar situation prevailed in the sale of the San Diego Sun to the rival Union-
Tribune in 1939. San Diego Sun Publishing Co. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 2 T.C. 794, 800-02 (1943). The validity of this kind of ancillary
covenant has never been questioned in a newspaper anti-trust proceeding, although,
considering all of the circumstances, a question might fairly be raised as to its
"reasonableness" -the criterion of evaluation under the common law restraint
of trade doctrine. "A restraint of trade is unreasonable . . . if it . . . tends to
create, or has for its purpose to create a monopoly." RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 515 (1932). Further, such a covenant may be viewed as evidence of a Sherman
Act violation. See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 165-66
(1911) ; United States v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 208 Fed. 733 (N.D. Ohio
1913). Another reported decision unmasks a non-ancillary contract in which the
Richmond News-Leader agreed to pay a rival paper, the Times-Dispatch, $70,000
a year to terminate the publication of a competing afternoon paper. The contract
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over the Item properties and sold them for a reported $400,000. 43
As a condition of the sale the purchaser expressly agreed that
he would publish no Sunday edition for ten years. While the
Times-Picayune Company involvement is not apparent on the
surface additional information suggests it had a role. On Jan-
uary 1, 1940, a year before the sale of the Item properties, the
Times-Picayune Company, then the largest consumer of news-
print in New Orleans, terminated its newsprint requirements
contract with International. 44 Naturally disturbed by this ac-
tion and anxious to renew their dealings International dis-
patched a vice president to New Orleans. In the spring of 1941
he had several discussions with the Times-Picayune Company's
president; in one he announced the plan for reorganizing the
Item and suspending its Sunday operation.4 A month after this
was done the Times-Picayune Company entered into a new ten-
year contract with International covering its entire newsprint
requirements. 46 Whether the contract amounted to a quid pro
quo for the obliteration of the Sunday Item cannot be conclu-
sively determined on the basis of the evidence available, partly
because the documents that might further illuminate the nego-
tiations were destroyed (under unexplained circumstances)
sometime between 1941 and 1950. Perhaps the concurrence of
events, though of great consequence to International and the
Times-Picayune Company, was pure coincidence - but the in-
ference of a tacit understanding is still very hard to rebut. In
any case, whether the Times-Picayune Company was a party
to the arrangement or not, competition in the Sunday market
was eliminated. And since the Item had ceased publication of
its morning paper, the Tribune, on January 13, 1941, a few
months prior to the date of its sale to Ralph Nicholson, the
company also had an unchallenged hold on the morning field.
Under the conditions it was enabled to bolster these positions
since, during the war years, it was virtually impossible for a
new entrant into the newspaper business either to acquire essen-
between the parties also provided that "neither paper during the term of five
years would permit its plant to be used for the publication of any daily or Sunday
paper, other than its own editions, in competition with the other paper." News
Leader Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 18 B.T.A. 1212, 1213 (1930).
Such an agreement is unlawful on its face. United States v. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), a!f'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
43. Record 581-82, 586-88, 591. International Paper financed the entire trans-
action, advancing the $400,000 and holding all the Item's common stock as secur-
ity. It continued in this position until 1949 when David Stern bought the paper.
44. Id. at 578.
45. Id. at 584-85.
46. Id. at 589.
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tial equipment or to obtain a supply of newsprint. Given the
company's leading place in the market, the existence of intense
product differentiation, and substantial economies of scale, these
additional impediments made new entry totally improbable. 47
Excess Profits
Supernormal profits, in conjunction with other evidence,
offer important if not conclusive evidence of the presence of
monopoly. On this count, too, an accusing finger can be pointed
squarely at the Times-Picayune Company. In the years 1947,
1948, and 1949 the company earned more than 20% on equity,
after the payment of all taxes. In more detail the figures are
these :48
Net Income Net Income as
Year (after taxes) Net Worth % of Net Worth
1947 $1,333,131 $5,572,337 23.9
1948 1,212,923 5,086,261 23.8
1949 1,353,510 6,738,770 20.1
While evidence for earlier years is unavailable, there is nothing
to suggest that the firm's performance in any of these three
years 1947-49 was out of the ordinary. In fact, 1949 was re-
garded by the company as unsatisfying, with a lower profit
rate attributable to the increasingly vigorous competition of the
Item; as the discussion in Part II will show, the relative decline
of the States in the afternoon field in 1949 was one of the
reasons for the inauguration of the unit rule in February 1950.
In the years after 1950 there is again no evidence to suggest
that the rate of return significantly declined. While the absence
of data for a longer period compels a word of caution, it must
be acknowledged that the Times-Picayune Company's 1947-1949
profit rates are strikingly high. An after-tax return of 20%
is equivalent to that earned by du Pont in the sale of cellophane,
where it possessed substantial control over price.49 Moreover,
such a profit rate is nearly three times that of all corporations
47. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 173-76, 237-64 (1959).
48. The net income figures are taken from GX 6, Record 1286B, and GX 8,
Record 1292. Net worth data (generally assets less liabilities and here equal to
the sum of capital stock, surplus, and undivided profits) for 1947 and 1948 are
derived from information in GX 7, Record 1288A; for 1949 the figure is esti-
mated on the basis of data contained in GX 8, Record 1292 and in GX 7. The
last column in the table is calculated from the other figures presented.
49. Stocking & Mueller, The Cellophone Case and the New Competition, 45
AM. ECON. REv. 29 (1955).
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in 1949.50 Certainly it is consistent with monopolistic behavior,
a judgment which tends to be substantiated by the other factors
that have been noted - intense seller concentration, extreme
product differentiation, monopolistic price behavior, and arti-
ficially impeded entry.
Conclusion
That the Times-Picayune Company in 1950, as today, pos-
sessed great market power which it exercised in the manner
expected of a monopolist seems well established by the evidence.
The New Orleans market itself was at all relevant times dis-
tinguished by a very small number of sellers, ranging from
three in 1933 to two at the time the 1950 antitrust litigation
began, to one since 1958. The morning paper, the Times-
Picayune, has been dominant for many years, largely because
of its strong appeal to advertisers. The company has priced like
a monopolist, it has endeavored to increase the strength of its
position through pricing tactics, and it has, on the basis of the
evidence available, earned excessive profits.
However, surprising though it may seem and in spite of its
apparent amenability to a charge of monopolization under sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act, the Times-Picayune Company's mar-
ket position was not the subject of the Antitrust Division's
prosecution; rather it was the application of the so-called unit
rule, or "forced combination" rate, to general advertising in
February 1950, that triggered the government's ire. It is to this
matter that we must turn.
II. THE NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE LITIGATION
The principal characteristics of New Orleans newspaper
publication having been described, the details of the Times-
Picayune antitrust litigation can now be meaningfully con-
sidered. In this section, after first reviewing the incidents and
background of the relevant pricing tactics and outlining their
interpretation by the enforcement officials and the courts, the
actual market implications are examined over the full period
from 1950 to the time of the Item's sale in 1958.
The Alleged Exclusionary Tactics
In the years before 1950 general advertisers (who provided
50. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 381-82 (1959).
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about 14% of the two paper's total advertising linage) could
purchase space in either the States or the Times-Picayune with-
out any form of restriction, though by placing identical adver-
tising copy in both papers they received a combined rate rang-
ing up to 20% less than the sum of the separate rates. From
1940 to 1950 even lower rates were made available to national
advertisers who agreed to place more than 10,000 lines of iden-
tical copy in the two papers, morning and afternoon, during a
single year ;51 in this case the lowest attainable combined rate
per line in 1940 for example, was 32¢, or 2¢ per line less than
was otherwise available. But the simple fact remains: although
they were offered considerable economic inducement to run their
copy in both papers, national advertisers were not obligated
to do so.
However, on December 1, 1949, the company announced that
beginning February 1, 1950, it was imposing the unit rule on
general advertising.52 This meant that space thereafter was
available only in its morning and afternoon papers as a com-
bination; copy could not be placed in either paper separately, at
any price, so that where a general advertiser had been able to
buy space at a per line rate of 40¢ in the Times-Picayune, or of
24¢ in the States or of 56¢ in both, under the unit rule copy had
to be placed in both papers at the previously optional-combine
price of 56¢ (or lower, depending on the quantity involved).
Considering the unit rule's adoption naturally raises the
question why the company decided to impose it at all and why
it selected the precise time it did. That the unit rule could have
been decreed at some earlier date is perfectly apparent; in fact,
the forced combination rate had been applicable to classified
advertising since 1935, and analysis of the trial record indicates
that the advisability of adopting the forced combine policy for
the general advertising category had been under discussion for
many years. This is not surprising, for the practice had become
an increasingly common one in the industry: in 1924, of 90
morning-evening newspaper combinations, 71 applied the unit
rule; in 1934 the number had increased to 153 out of 173; and
by 1948, of 175 such combinations, only eight, including the
Times-Picayune, had not adopted the unit rule.53 In the spring
51. Record 249-51.
52. GX 34, Record 1340.
53. EDITOR & PUBLISHER, July 19, 1958, p. 10. Other material on the extent
of the unit rule's use in newspaper publication as of 1949 may be found in
Record 1258 (district court finding that as of that year "approximately 180
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and summer of 1949 the company's major executives took up
the question again, prompted in part by the fact that its mil-
line rate for national advertising (that is, its per line rate per
1,000 circulation) had become noticeably higher than other prin-
cipal newspapers. The Times-Picayune milline, for instance,
was $2.14; but that for the New York Daily News was $1.18
and for the Kansas City Star (already using the unit rule)
$1.25. To offset this apparent competitive disadvantage all that
need be done, so the argument went, was to adopt the unit rule
and link together the circulation of the States and the Times-
Picayune; the accompanying reduction in the milline might well
attract additional advertisers. 54 Moreover, adoption of the unit
rule afforded a seemingly easy way of increasing advertising
revenue. What it amounted to was raising the price for adver-
tising in the city's only morning paper (and its largest in terms
of circulation), with the effect also of increasing the advertising
carried in its afternoon paper, the States. All so simple, and so
very obvious, that one wonders why it had not been done years
before.
Yet if the possibility of cutting the milline and simulta-
neously enlarging revenue supplies such a logical explanation
for the company's adoption of the unit rule, why was this ac-
tion taken in the fall of 1949? The forces that precipitated the
decision at that time seem fairly clear. With the sale of the
Item to the Stern interests in July 1949, a more vigorous com-
petitive struggle was foreseen, as was suggested by the rumor
that the Item might establish a Sunday edition and break the
Times-Picayune Company's exclusive grip on that large market.
Certainly these prospects gave the company no cause for op-
timism; and some of its fears, were soon borne out. In Septem-
ber 1949, the Item gained 35,485 lines of general advertising
while the States lost 3,152 lines, and over the first nine months
of 1949 the States carried only 50.9% of the city's general ad-
vertising in the afternoon field, compared with 52.3% in 1948.
publishers, constituting the vast majority of the publishers publishing morning
and evening newspapers, were using unit combination rates") and in GX 153,
Record 1554-68. The Brief on Behalf of 98 Newspaper Publishers as Amici
Curiae, Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953),
pp. 1A-6A (appendix) contains some additional information. By 1958, in con-
trast to -949, the rigid adherence to the combination rate on general advertising
35 offered general advertisers an option to use either paper (though the rate
structure still induced joint use), whereas in 1948 only 8 of 175 did so. Editor
was less marked; in that more recent year, of 176 morning-evening publishers,
& Publisher, July 19, 1958, p. 10.
54. Record 252-54, 296.
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Executives of the company viewed these developments as "very
disturbing"; on October 21, 1949, its General Advertising Man-
ager wrote that "it is obvious that the States' leadership over
the Item in general advertising is shrinking."55 In October the
situation did not improve. Although both the States and the
Item increased their general advertising linage during the
month, the States added only about 19,000 lines (compared with
the preceding month) while the Item picked up some 64,000
lines.
Faced with its deteriorating position in the afternoon field,
officials of the company met frequently during the autumn of
1949 to discuss the situation. While the content of their delib-
erations is not known, the evidence at hand suggests strongly
that the actual decision to invoke the unit rule was made at a
meeting in November attended by the Times-Picayune Adver-
tising Manager and its national advertising representatives. 6
In reaching their decision to adopt the unit rule executives
of the company gave primary attention to revenue and strategic
factors, and did not make cost considerations explicit. The latter
were implicitly involved, of course, for the rule, in operation,
meant an increase in the volume of advertising that would
permit more efficient utilization of existing excess capacity.
More importantly, however, the forced combination principle
called for no material increase in typographical costs; adver-
tising copy that might previously have been prepared for the
presses and run in one paper now would be run in both. Certain
costs would rise as a result (for newsprint and ink, most no-
tably), but the proportionately heavier costs associated with
composition would not. Consequently the company could expect
to move out, and down along a declining unit cost curve. None-
theless, the company thought of the unit rule essentially as a
device that would generate more revenue and concomitantly ex-
pand the States' share of the afternoon market, or at least
moderate the increasingly intense competition of the Item.
Noting the apparent increase in the States' linage that followed
initiation of the unit rule in 1950, a company executive ex-
55. Id. at 1328.
56. Id. at 256-58. The company, however, insisted that the decision was made
in July 1949. Brief for Petitioner, p. 20, Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). Yet one of its witnesses could not even
remember whether the forced combine rate had been discussed at the summer
meeting. Record 88. Further, if the matter was considered at that time the rate
card in which the unit rule was announced was not approved until November.
Id. at 256.
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plained that "that was because our morning edition carried
quite a volume of business, and the advertisers using our morn-
ing edition, in adopting our afternoon edition, morning and
evening combination, would necessarily give added business to
the States. '57 But the validity of that conclusion depended on
the unwillingness of advertisers to shift from the States and the
Times-Picayune to the Item as they easily could. The only rea-
son they would not do so in the face of the company's large
effective rate increase is attributable to the importance to them
of the Times-Picayune - the city's only morning paper and its
distinct leader in circulation. The Times-Picayune Company
knew it held a strong weapon in the form of its morning paper
and attempted to make use of it, as can normally be expected
of any monopolist striving to expand and insulate its bastion.
Since the government centered its attention on the unit rule
and its alleged consequences it has here received the principal
emphasis. However, one of the other Times-Picayune pricing
strategies deserves special mention. In the pricing of retail ad-
vertising, which accounted for over two-thirds of all advertising
linage, the Times-Picayune Company, as previously noted, never
invoked the unit rule. Hence retail advertisers were free to
place copy in either the States or the Times-Picayune, though
they were offered very substantial discounts based on the
amount of their linage. For example, in 1950 the cost of retail
advertising in the Times-Picayune was normally 26¢ per line;
but if the advertiser agreed to place, say, 100,000 lines of copy
in the paper during a year, the per line cost dropped to 19¢.
In itself this does not seem likely to have had any adverse
impact on the Item, which also made available similar, though
relatively smaller, volume discounts. Nevertheless the Times-
Picayune Company did have an important, though perhaps
subtle, advantage. Most retail advertisers, particularly the
larger accounts, regularly placed copy in the Times-Picayune.
By entering into a contract with the company to provide a
given amount of advertising during a twelve-month period an
advertiser received an attractive discount rate which was also
available for space taken in the States.
An example is in order. Suppose a department store held a
100,000 line contract with the company. Even though it might
place 80% of its material in the morning paper, it was entitled
57. Id. at 76.
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to put any quantity of advertising in the States at the rate ap-
plicable to one who might be putting 100,000 lines into this
paper alone. If the store thus put a 2,500 line ad in the States
(roughly one full page) the cost was 121/2 per line as compared
with the regular charge for this amount of space of 171/2¢. 8
Under these circumstances, and especially in view of the domi-
nant position of the Times-Picayune, retail advertisers had a
strong inducement to place copy in the States rather than the
Item. While the latter also extended quantity discounts, rarely
would an advertiser consume enough space in that paper alone
to warrant a rate, as in the preceding example, as low as 121/2 0.
By taking into account space taken in both of its papers the
Times Picayune Company, on the other hand, was able to make
advertisers a very attractive offer and one which worked to the
advantage of the States in its struggle with the Item. Many ob-
servers, including those at high managerial levels in the Item,
felt that this particular pricing strategy was far more harmful
than the unit rule itself.
So described are the principal relevant pricing tactics of
the Times-Picayune Company. How were they viewed by the
Antitrust Division? And how were they interpreted by the
courts?
The Unit Rule as Viewed by the Antitrust Division
and the Courts
As the officials of the Antitrust Division eyed the diverse
pricing tactics of the Times-Picayune Company, the real culprit
was the unit rule. The other strategies the company employed,
such as the use of retail advertising contracts that permitted
copy to be placed in the States at markedly lower volume rates,
were illuminated during the trial, but received scant emphasis.
This may have been a serious error, in view of the overwhelm-
ing importance to newspapers of retail advertising. Be that
as it may, neither the government prosecutors nor the courts
gave any significant attention to anything besides the unit rule
and thus it became the focal point of the case. In the govern-
ment's view the Times-Picayune Company was simply endeavor-
ing to use its dominant position in the city's morning field to
enlarge its position in the afternoon field, to the manifest detri-
58. Record 237-39. A sample contract covering retail advertising is set out in
GX 92, Record 237-39.
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ment of the Item.59 On June 14, 1950, it filed a complaint in
the Federal District Court at New Orleans, alleging that the
defendants (the company itself and four of its principal of-
ficers)60 had "combined and conspired" to restrain trade
through the use of advertising charges and related policies,
essentially the unit rule, and had similarly attempted to monop-
olize the New Orleans newspaper market in violation of the
Sherman Act.61
In the district court, Judge Christenberry, after a lengthy
nonjury trial,6 2 concluded that the defendant had indeed vio-
lated the law, using its monopoly position "to force buyers of
advertising space to purchase what they do not want, space in
the States, in order to obtain what they require, space in the
Times-Picayune. '63 The result, in his view, was a restrictive
effect, both on advertisers and on the Item. A section 1 Sher-
man Act violation was therefore made out on an analogy to the
tying cases in which the seller of one product requires a buyer
also to take from him some other product. Insofar as section 2
was concerned the district court also discerned a violation, with
the imposition of the unit rule on general (and classified) ad-
59. More specifically the government argued that the Times-Picayune Com-
pany and those of its officers named as defendants, "with a monopoly in the
morning newspaper field, 'command the entrance for' advertisements into that
field, employ that 'monopoly power as a trade weapon against' their competition,
and use their 'strategic monopoly position to sell' on a non-competitive basis in
what would otherwise be [a] competitive situation." Brief for the United States,
p. 24, Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
(The internal quotations are from United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100
(1948).) Moreover, argued the government, the unit rule reduces to nothing
more than a tying arrangement, which in view of the company's dominant market
position will restrain trade and tend to the elimination of competition. This par-
ticular aspect of the case is considered further at note 79 et 8eq., infra.
60. The individual defendants were accused of having conspired with one
another in violation of the Sherman Act. The district court, in a debatable
ruling, concluded that these allegations "were not urged, and must be considered
as having been abandoned." United States v. Times-Picayune Publishing Co.,
105 F. Supp. 670, 672 (E.D. La. 1952). In the remainder of the discussion in
the text reference is made only to the defendant company.
61. Record 1-9. Inter alia, and in addition to the unit rule, the company
was accused of "using the income from the Times-Picayune to offset the losses
or reductions in profits of the States, incident to arbitrarily low rates for adver-
tising carried in the States" and "increasing the pages of the States at increased
cost of publication without corresponding increased revenue for the purpose of
inducing and forcing circulation and advertising from the Item to the States
. .. Id. at 1, 8. The district court ruled that these allegations had not been
proved. United States v. Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 105 F. Supp. 670, 677
(E.D. La. 1952).
62. The printed record of the trial runs to over 1,600 pages, including testi-
mony and exhibits.
63. United States v. Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 105 F. Supp. 670, 678
(E.D. La. 1952).
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vertising found to reflect an attempt to monopolize "that seg-
ment of the afternoon-newspaper general and classified adver-
tising field which was represented by those advertisers who also
required morning newspaper space and who could not because
of budgetary limitations or financial inability purchase space
in both afternoon papers. '6 4
An appeal was taken directly to the Supreme Court and on
May 25, 1953, it reversed the lower court's ruling, thus com-
pletely absolving the defendants from the antitrust charges
which had been prosecuted below.65 Justice Clark, writing for
the five-man majority, believed that the case presented no tying
arrangement at all; here, he argued, there really were not two
distinct products, the morning and the afternoon papers, but
only one, namely the "city's newspaper readers" who he felt
were regarded by advertisers simply as "fungible customer
potential." 66 Having so disposed of the tying argument, the
Court's majority turned to a broader consideration of the case
and concluded that the facts revealed no unreasonable restraint
of trade. In their estimation the Times-Picayune did not occupy
a "dominant" position in the city's newspaper advertising mar-
ket since its share of general and classified linage over the
years only "hovered around 40%." 6 7 As well, adoption of the
unit rule was found to be motivated by the defendant's "legiti-
mate business aims," and resulted in no harm to the Item. In
fact, said the majority, "the Item flourishes. '68  The Court's
minority, in a short opinion by Justice Burton (joined by Jus-
64. Id. at 681. On this issue the district court made no explicit finding as to
the presence of a specific intent to monopolize, in fact deemphasizing the role
of intent in reliance on Judge Learned Hand's Alcoa opinion. United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1945). However, Alcoa in-
volved the completed offense of monopolization instead of simply an attempt to
monopolize and Judge Hand clearly indicated that a finding of specific intent
was still vital in an attempt situation. Id. at 431-32. When the Times-Picayune
case reached the Supreme Court it set aside the trial court's finding of a sec-
tion 2 violation on the ground that the company's adoption of the unit rule was
"predominantly motivated by legitimate business aims" and therefore did not
satisfy the specific intent requirement. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 627 (1953). This conclusion of the Supreme Court is chal-
lenged. See notes 83-84 infra and accompanying text.
65. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
66. Id. at 613.
67. Id. at 611-12. Of course, as other writers have pointed out, even if the
company had had a complete monopoly, and all advertising was on the unit rule,
the morning paper's share of total linage could not have exceeded 50% of all
advertising linage. DIRLAM & KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW AND Eco-
NOMICS OF ANTITRUST POLICY 107 (1954) [hereinafter cited as DIRLAM &
KAHN].
68. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 620
(1953).
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tices Black, Douglas, and Minton), contended that the district
court's factual judgment was supported by the evidence, and
should therefore be affirmed, not being "clearly erroneous"
within the meaning of rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 69 The minority clearly felt that the three papers
were separate products and concluded that the defendant, as
charged, had employed its "distinct, conceded and complete
monopoly of access to the morning newspaper readers in the
New Orleans area ... to restrain unreasonably the competition
between its evening newspaper, the New Orleans States, and
the independent New Orleans Item, in the competitive field of
evening newspaper advertising."
In the subsequent analysis two major issues are considered,
both of obvious relevance to the Supreme Court decision. First,
was the Item harmed by its rival's adoption of the unit rule as
the government contended? Second, was the Item's eventual
death in 1958 substantially attributable to this 1950 market
tactic of the Times-Picayune Company?
Consequences of the Unit Rule
First of all, a warning is in order to anyone who has read
(or will read) the Supreme Court's opinion in the Times-
Picayune case, for the facts later to be developed here will
indeed seem strange and inconsistent. The reason stems from
the kind of proof offered by the government in support of its
principal contention that the unit rule had an adverse effect
on the Item. This evidence, which compared the linage carried
by the two publishers in certain months of 1949 with the same
months of 1950, and which was summarized in a series of
tabular exhibits (reproduced in the Court's majority opinion),
on its face did tend to confirm the government theory. 0 For
example, comparing the months of November 1949 and 1950,
one table indicated that the Item's share of general advertising
had declined from 47.5% to 38.7%. Close inspection, however,
reveals that this type of evidence was gravely misleading, for
in fact the underlying data were not comparable at all. As will
be recalled, effective March 4, 1950, the Item commenced publi-
cation of a Sunday paper and ceased publication of its regular
Saturday edition. Linage appearing in six weekday editions for
69. Id. at 628.
70. Id. at 618 n.39; Record 1450.
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1949 was thus being compared with that for five weekday edi-
tions in 1950 (after March). Obviously the weekday linage for
the Item would decline under such circumstances, without refer-
ence to the unit rule at all. Realistic evaluation requires con-
siderable recomputation and in the paragraphs that follow the
results are discussed.
In analyzing the consequences of the unit rule, one fact is
readily apparent: there was a highly uneven impact on general
advertisers. Some simply did not want to advertise at all in an
afternoon paper. Others, especially noticeable in the case of
food product manufacturers, preferred the Item to the States
since they believed it did not duplicate Times-Picayune reader-
ship to as great a degree.7 ' A few advertisers actually altered
their advertising policies, shifting their advertising from the
Times-Picayune Company papers to other media. Kaiser-Frazer,
for one, was receptive to the notion of switching entirely to
the Item and supplementing that coverage with radio adver-
tising.72 However, the record does demonstrate that most ad-
vertisers continued to use the Times-Picayune in spite of the
unit rule. This meant that the number of advertising accounts
in the States increased sharply in 1950 (the number using just
two papers, the Times-Picayune and the States, rising from 249
to 387).73 But, interestingly, the number of general advertising
accounts represented in the Item during 1950 as compared with
1949 declined only slightly. Some advertisers continued to use
the Item along with the city's two other papers, and a few
simply abandoned the Times-Picayune and States for the Item.
In assessing the impact of the unit rule the crucial index,
however, is the division of the market in terms of linage be-
tween the Item and the Times-Picayune Company, leaving par-
ticular papers and editions aside. 74 Did the Item lose ground
and the Times-Picayune/States gain? Taking this approach one
finds that in 1950 the Item Company's share of general adver-
tising linage in the New Orleans dailies went up, not down,
from about 23% to 26.5%. This was also true in each of the
three advertising categories, with the result that the Item's
share of linage of all types (retail, classified, and general) rose
71. Record 285, 357, 393-94.
72. GX 48, Record 1363.
73. GX 109B, 110B, Record 1453-54.
74. The comparisons that follow are based on data taken from MEDIA RECORDS
for the years 1949 to date. This is the authoritative source of information for
newspaper advertising linage.
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from 22% to 25%.7 5 If the unit rule, therefore, had any notice-
able market impact, it appears actually to have helped the Item
Company, at least in 1950. What about over the longer run? By
1957, the last full year of its operation, the Item Company's
share of all advertising linage placed in New Orleans daily
newspapers had declined to slightly over 21%, off considerably
from the 25% share it held in 1950.76 Although the largest per-
centage decline took place in classified advertising (the Item's
share fell from 21% in 1950 to 13% in 1957),"7 the most im-
portant setback was in the retail advertising category since this
represents about two-thirds of all linage; here the Item's 26.5%
share in 1950 rose to 29.5% in 1952 and then declined to 27%
in 1956 and 24.5% in 1957. Over the full period from 1949 to
1957 the Item's share of general linage fell from 26.5% (1950)
to 24%; this amounted only to a decline of about 400,000 lines
on a base of over 14 million lines in all categories for 1957.
While the division of the market in terms of retail, classi-
fied, and general advertising linage between the two companies
without regard to any particular editions is seemingly the best
criterion in assessing the consequences of the Times-Picayune
pricing strategies, attention should also be directed specifically
to the afternoon field since this is where the unit rule might be
expected to have had its sharpest impact. In this respect it
must be recalled that the Item published only five daily issues
during most of 1950 instead of six as in 1949; this necessarily
prevents any very exact comparisons. Nevertheless, and in spite
of its fewer weekday editions, the evidence shows that the Item
carried only about 17,000 less lines of general advertising in its
weekday editions in 1950 than in 1949. The corresponding linage
75. In 1949 the Item carried 13.8 million lines of advertising as compared
with 44.9 million for its rival. But in 1950 the Item handled 16.6 million lines,
while the Times-Picayune and the States together carried 46.7 million lines. 88
MEDIA RECORDS 65 (1949) ; 92 MEDIA RECORDS 65 (1950).
76. Of a total of 72 million lines of advertising appearing in the city's news-
papers during 1957 the Item carried 16.1 million lines. 120 MEDIA RECORDS 69
(1957). Thus it had lost position in the market both absolutely and relatively
as compared with 1950. The States' linage meanwhile had increased slightly.
But it was the Times-Picayune and the Sunday Times-Picayune/States that had
made the greatest gains during the seven-year period-more than ten million
lines.
77. Probably the major explanation for this pronounced decline in the Item's
share of classified linage rests in its disproportionately higher rates. In 1956,
for example, the Item charged 450 per line of classified advertising; a line of
advertising in the Times-Picayune/States (on the unit rule) cost 730. But in
terms of circulation the Item was badly out of line; at a price only 62% greater
its rival provided nearly three times its circulation. NEwsPAPER RATES AND
DATA 285-87 (Jan. 15, 1957).
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of the States went up sharply, of course, by more than 600,000
lines, as it picked up all of the national advertising carried in
the Times-Picayune under the unit rule. It warrants reemphasis,
however, that if the overall performance of the two publishers
is taken into account, disregarding any particular editions
(morning, afternoon, Sunday) the Item fared much better in
1950 than in 1949, carrying an additional 2.8 million lines of
advertising in all categories as contrasted with a similar gain
of 1.8 million lines for the Times-Picayune Company. Within
the afternoon field though the Item clearly lost some ground,
not only in 1950 but over the succeeding seven years as well.
Where in 1950 the Item carried 32.5% of the city's afternoon
classified linage, by 1951 this had slipped to 27% and by 1957
it was down to less than 19%. A similar though less pronounced
pattern also prevailed in the case of general advertising car-
ried in the afternoon papers, with the Item's share declining
from 42% in 1950 to 35% in 1957. By contrast, the Item con-
tinued to hold its share of retail advertising. Although the total
amount of retail advertising placed in both afternoon papers fell
in 1957, the Item still accounted for 67% of linage in this cate-
gory as compared with 66% in 1950. What is far more impor-
tant in this respect, however, is the fact that in 1957 the week-
day Item carried 500,000 fewer lines of retail advertising copy
than in 1956; the States also suffered a loss, but of only 100,000
lines.
Looking at the Sunday market, where the Times-Picayune/
States directly confronted the Item, we find that the Item was
not faring badly in 1958 when it sold out, relative to its 1950
performance, though its position had begun to deteriorate slight-
ly in the later years. In 1951, the Item's first full year with a
Sunday edition, it carried about 25% of all Sunday advertising
linage. In 1952 this climbed to 30%, and by 1957 its share was
still about 27%. Perhaps most striking, however, were changes
in the Item's Sunday retail linage. In 1954 the Item carried
more than 36% of this type of advertising; but then it gradual-
ly began to lose position, so that by 1957 its share was 27%.
So far the findings fail to make allowance for actual changes
in advertising rates that were placed in effect in the years after
1950. This can best be done by comparing the two publishers'
milline rates (the rate per line per 1,000 circulation) for the
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full period with their respective market shares.7 8 Taking total
daily (morning and afternoon) general advertising as an index,
it has been noted that the Item's overall share fell from 25% in
1950 and 24% in 1951 to 21% in 1957. Significantly, during
this seven-year period the Item's milline for national advertis-
ing was rising a great deal more steeply than that of the Times-
Picayune. In 1950 the Item's milline was about $2.65, the Times-
Picayune's $1.95 (reflecting the combined circulation of the
Times-Picayune and the States). This absolute dollars and cents
differential gradually widened so that where in 1955 the Item's
milline was $3.50 and the Times-Picayune's $2.40, by 1956, as
the result of a relatively large rate increase and a decline in cir-
culation, the Item's milline rose to almost $4.00. The final ac-
count for 1957 showed an Item milline of $4.10 as compared
with the Times-Picayune's $2.55. Rather obviously the Times-
Picayune Company offerings became relatively much more at-
tractive over the years, tending to dissipate whatever adverse
market reaction may have been generated by the 1950 extension
of the unit rule to general advertising.
The Case Reconsidered
Although the Times-Picayune Company apparently hoped
that the application of the unit rule to general advertising would
"slow up" the Item and reduce its share of the market, it did
not have this effect; in fact, as a result, the Item may actually
have picked up some advertising from those sources that were
unwilling to meet the effectively higher price imposed by its
adversary. In this sense, then, the unit rule failed of its pur-
pose. To the modest extent, however, that the tactic was thought
of as a way of providing the States with some shelter - keep-
ing its position from deteriorating any further - and of en-
larging aggregate advertising revenue, it was successful. In
1950, in spite of the large effective rate increase which the unit
rule meant to national advertisers that had previously used only
one of the two combined papers or that had employed the Times-
Picayune and the Item, the Times-Picayune Company carried
nearly a million more lines of general advertising than in 1949;
while it lost some linage in the Times-Picayune itself (about
74,000 lines in 1950), it more than offset this with increased
78. The millines are calculated on the basis of the prevailing open general
advertising rates and the ABC-certified daily circulation for the papers in each
of the years indicated.
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linage in the States (amounting to some 600,000 lines and pre-
sumably the direct outcome of the unit rule) and in the Sunday
edition (where a gain of 400,000 lines was reported in 1950).
The Item also gained general linage in 1950, carrying some 682,-
000 more lines than in 1949, with this improvement largely at-
tributable to the inauguration of the Sunday paper. But the
Times-Picayune Company clearly gained more, at higher rates
than in 1949, and accordingly found its economic fortunes great-
ly improved.
What then can be said of the Supreme Court decision itself?
First of all, its handling of the tying clause aspect of the case
deserves special mention, especially in the light of the Court's
1958 Northern Pacific decision.7 9 As the law was interpreted
there a tying arrangement, defined as a situation in which a
seller conditions the sale of one product on the buyer's purchase
of a different (or "tied") product, is unlawful per se so long as
the seller "has sufficient economic power with respect to the
tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the
market for the tied product." ' At first glance the analogy of
such a rule to the facts in the Times-Picayune litigation may
seem perfectly obvious: the company was tying the sale of na-
tional (and classified) advertising in the States to the dominant
Times-Picayune. The matter cannot, however, be so easily dis-
posed of. In the usual tying case there are two distinct products
- for instance, salt tablets and the machines which deposit the
tablets in canned goods - which are entirely unrelated to one
another from the standpoint of manufacture. In the Times-
Picayune situation, by contrast, the advertising copy appearing
in the morning and evening papers was identical, printed from
the same plates on the same presses even though it appeared at
different hours of the day in distinguishable papers. To make
the issue more vivid, suppose that the Times-Picayune Company
had simply begun in 1950 to publish just one paper (bearing
the banner Times-Picayune and States) in various editions
"around-the-clock" and accepted advertising only in the "day's"
paper. Did not the actual case amount to the same thing? Al-
though two papers were involved, the physical ingredient in
issue - printed advertising - was a unity, a single product, and
not comparable to the standing tying situation in which the
79. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). See also United
States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-51 (1962).
80. Id. at 6.
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commodities are produced separately.8 ' So considered there
simply was no tying case presented at all because there were no
distinguishable goods, one being tied to the other.
If, however, the facts are felt to present the ingredients of
a tying case, present judicial interpretation would appear to
condemn the behavior as a per se offense, just as it would price
fixing, on the theory that the competitive freedom of other sell-
ers of the tied product is necessarily restricted. In this view
tying agreements serve "hardly any purpose beyond the sup-
pression of competition.11 2 Applying the Northern Pacific logic
to the Times-Picayune litigation, and denominating national ad-
vertising in the States as the tied product and the same kind of
advertising in the Times-Picayune as the tying product, and
recognizing that the morning paper was dominant in the mar-
ket, the result would seem to follow that the unit rule in and of
itself unreasonably restrained trade in violation of the Sherman
Act. This disposition of the case, let it be emphasized, would
be made without any analysis of the actual market effects. Yet
the foregoing discussion indicates that the purported tie in the
case had little, if any, adverse impact on the Item, the alleged
victim. This certainly suggests that the prevailing approach to
tying arrangements deserves considerable refinement, certainly
to the extent it is premised on the belief that a tie inevitably
impairs the competitive opportunities of rival sellers of the tied
product.
All factors considered, in its treatment of those aspects of
the Times-Picayune case pertaining to section 1 of the Sher-
man Act the Supreme Court majority came to a result that is
consistent with the evidence. The facts simply do not support
81. Dirlam and Kahn, to the contrary, argue that a tying arrangement was
involved; the unit rule did not present "an inevitable, 'natural' single package
... . Many advertisers obviously did not consider the package a single product
until they were forced to do so ....... DIRLAM & KAHN 105. Both assertions
are open to serious dispute: First, why was this any less "natural" than for a
fountain pen manufacturer, say, to require buyers to purchase both a cap and
a functional pen in one unit? Second, does not the fact that virtually all other
publishers of morning and evening papers imposed the unit rule suggest this was
indeed a "natural" policy? Third, if buyers formerly were allowed to purchase
trousers and coats separately, and now are required either to take both together
or nothing, thus being compelled to view the package as a single product, could
it nevertheless fairly be said that a tie existed? For a more wary interpretation
of the Times-Picayune facts, intimating that a tie may not in fact have been
involved, see Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust
Laws, 72 HARv. L. REV. 50 (1958), and Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the
Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957).
82. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305
(1949).
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a conclusion that in using the unit rule the Times-Picayune
Company had restrained trade. But this is not to say that the
reasons given in Justice Clark's majority opinion are themselves
sound. (To cite one major flaw, he found that the Times-Pica-
yune was not dominant when nothing in fact could be further
from the truth; indeed such a conclusion must have come as a
shocking revelation to New Orleans advertisers and executives
of the Times-Picayune Company.) What rationalizes the result
reached by the Court's majority is that while the unit rule
worked to the advantage of the Times-Picayune Company by
expanding its advertising linage, it did not work to the disad-
vantage of the Item and since the section 1 aspects of the gov-
ernment's case were premised principally on that supposition,
exoneration on this count was in order.
When, however, we turn to section 2 of the Sherman Act the
Court's finding of innocence seems erroneous. In this respect
the government had charged that the company had attempted to
monopolize advertising in the New Orleans market and the dis-
trict court had found such a violation, deeming the adoption of
the unit rule adequate evidence in support of its determination.
On appeal the Supreme Court took the highly questionable posi-
tion that in invoking the unit rule the company was "predomi-
nantly motivated by legitimate business aims."'8 This conclu-
sion is inconsistent with a fair reading of the record, for while
business considerations clearly played a role, it is evident, given
the timing of the action and the circumstances then prevailing,
that the company was largely prompted by a desire to "slow the
Item down."'8 4 That in taking the step it was not entirely suc-
cessful does not alter the fact that the company attempted to
exert its considerable strength to bolster its own market position
at the expense of its rival. Accordingly a correct outcome would
have called for affirming the lower court's ruling that the com-
pany had violated section 2 of the Sherman Act by attempting
to monopolize the relevant market.
Demise of the Item
In 1958 the Times-Picayune Company purchased the Item
for a reported $3.4 million and thus became the sole daily news-
83. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 627
(1953).
84. United States v. Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 105 F. Supp. 670, 678
(E.D. La. 1952).
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paper publisher in New Orleans. The evidence shows that at
least as early as 1957 the Item became a marginal business en-
terprise. For the first five months of 1956 it had realized a net
profit of $134,861; but this declined to $43,524 for the same
period of 1957; and from January through May of 1958 the
Item incurred a loss of $70,473.85 At this point the sale nego-
tiations began.
But what explains the Item's post-1956 financial difficulties?
Many forces obviously were at work. David Stern, the paper's
publisher, blames higher costs - specifically for newsprint (its
cost had increased by 34% from 1949 to 1958) and labor.8 6 He
also attributes some of the responsibility to the unit rule ;87 but
if the preceding discussion is substantially accurate the imposi-
tion of the unit rule on general advertising in 1950 had little
significant adverse impact on the Item. The basic cause, rather,
appears to lie in a decline of 1.3 million lines of advertising that
took place in 1957, stemming largely from a drop in retail de-
partment store advertising. In 1956 the Item had carried 17,-
446,452 lines of advertising, including 10,643,743 lines of retail
advertising (of which 4,431,695 lines originated with the city's
department stores). But in 1957 its total linage dropped to
16,102,793 lines, with 68% of the contraction coming in the de-
partment store category. The States, its afternoon competitor,
suffered an even larger relative decline in the same advertising
category; but it was able to offset most of the loss with increases
in other kinds of retail copy. Moreover, the Times-Picayune
gained more than 581,000 lines of retail advertising in 1957, and
this, in addition to a similar substantial gain in its Sunday edi-
tion, meant that where the Item Company lost over 900,000 lines
of retail advertising its competitor, primarily due to the strength
of its morning paper, gained some 770,000 lines of retail adver-
tising in addition to 130,000 lines in other classifications. It
was the decline in retail advertising in 1956 that broke the
Item's back. Looking to the latter months of 1956 it is apparent
that even then the Item was close to the precipice. And with the
85. Editor and Publisher, July 19, 1958, p. 9.
86. Id. at 9, 52. The Item had a union shop while the Times-Picayune Com-
pany does not. Although the two papers paid approximately the same wages,
fringe benefits were higher for the Item. Moreover, and of inestimable value,
the Times-Picayune Company was unhampered by certain work-rule restrictions
that were applicable to the typographical operations of the Item (and other
organized shops).
87. Stern also was motivated to sell the Item, excellent authority has it,
by the sociopolitical atmosphere in New Orleans. A northerner, he favored
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sharp decline in retail advertising that occurred in 1957, and
accompanying losses in operating revenue that were not offset
by cost reductions, operating deficits began showing up in 1957.
For its $3.4 million the Times-Picayune Company received
the Item's plant and printing equipment, along with covenants
from David Stern, the owner, and its principal editors that they
would not re-enter the business of daily newspaper publication
in New Orleans for at least five years. The Times-Picayune did
not receive the Item's current assets; nor did it intend to make
use of the plant and equipment it acquired, planning rather to
continue publication of a combined afternoon States-Item in its
own ample facilities. What it really got for its money, there-
fore, was a monopoly plus the erection of an artificial entry bar-
rier. For this it paid a large price, far more than the Item was
worth as a going concernA.5
In buying the Item the Times-Picayune Company sought the
prior assurance of the Antitrust Division that it would not bring
suit; in its behalf the company argued that under the "failing
firm" doctrine there could be no adverse competitive conse-
quences because the seller was in extremis. The Division acqui-
esced in the sale provided that the buyer, following its formal
purchase of the Item, would lease the paper back to its former
owner for a period of 60 days during which time any purchaser
might come forward and acquire the property for the "upset
price" of $3.4 million. The government also insisted that the
Times-Picayune Company dispose of its New Orleans radio sta-
tion and agree to abandon the unit rule on national advertising
for ten years.8 9 With all of these conditions the Times-Picayune
Company compiled, and when no buyer offered to match the
integration of the schools and felt that he would be obliged to take such a strong
stand on the issue that circulation might further decline, sending the paper
even deeper into the red. In this connection it is interesting to note A. J. Lieb-
ling's report that in 1959 the Times-Picayune and States supported the White
Supremacy candidate for Governor of Louisiana and opposed the more moderate
figures. LIEBLING, THE PRESs 64 (1961).
88. Cruel justice, too, for in 1949 the Times-Picayune Company reportedly
could have purchased the Item for a mere $1 million (the price paid by Stern).
At that time it declined to do so because it would have been "too monopolistic."
Record 610. Another account indicated that it might also have bought the Item
in 1941 for $400,000. Id. at 590.
89. The unit rule remains applicable to classified advertising, and the com-
pany may still make available discounts to those advertisers placing their copy
in both the States and the Times-Picayune. Currently the open line rate for
national advertising in both papers taken as a combination is $1.05; in the
Times-Picayune alone the rate is 800 and in the States 700: 1963 E&P YEAR&
BooK 116. It should not be startling to learn, therefore, that more than 98% of
all national advertising carried in the morning is carried over into the States.
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high price it was willing to pay, it gained absolute control of the
Item, promptly consolidating its publication with the States on
September 15, 1958.90
The most recent development of consequence occurred in
June 1962, when Samuel I. Newhouse, then the owner of a chain
of sixteen newspapers located in various parts of the country
(including, among others, the St. Louis Globe-Democrat, the
Newark Star-Ledger, and the Birmingham News),91 acquired
the Times-Picayune Company for a price of $42 million. In
making his offer public Newhouse revealed that in 1961 the
company had after tax net income of $2,482,907, affording a
return of 18.4% on net worth of $13,588,400.92 This compares
favorably with the 20% rate of return earned in 1949 (the last
prior year for which financial information has been made pub-
lic) and well characterizes the firm's monopoly position in New
Orleans daily newspaper publication.
III. THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The New Orleans experience offers many lessons as to the
possible role of antitrust policy in retarding the general decline
of newspaper competition in the United States. For one impor-
tant thing it reinforces the serious doubts that have been fre-
quently expressed over the wisdom and sufficiency of confining
antitrust enforcement to the suppression of supposedly detri-
mental forms of market conduct.9 3 In the Times-Picayune liti-
gation neither did the allegedly exclusionary pricing tactics have
the claimed effect in the short-run nor were they causally con-
90. Editor and Publisher, Sept. 20, 1958, p. 15.
91. 1963 E&P YEAR Booi 311. Mr. Newhouse also owns six television sta-
tions and Conde Nast Publications, Inc., publisher of Glamour, Vogue, House
& Garden, and other periodicals. N.Y. Times, June 8, 1962, p. 47, col. 2 (city
ed.).
92. Newhouse paid $150 per share for the 280,000 outstanding shares of the
Times-Picayune Company. Book value per share was $48.53, which equals net
worth of $13,588,400. The company's 1961 after-tax profit was $2,482,907. New
Orleans States-Item, May 29, 1962, p. 1, col. 1; Wall St. Journal, June 4,
1962, p. 15, col. 4. The Nicholson family held 21% of the outstanding shares.
When the Newhouse offer was first made they urged the other shareholders not
to sell. But their pleas were rejected and finally they, too, sold out. N.Y. Times,
June 5, 1962, p. 67, col. 1 (city ed.)
93. What explains this marked emphasis on conduct (or behavior, or prac-
tices) as distinct from position (or structure) is not entirely clear. To a degree
it may simply reflect enforcement predilection; antitrust officials feel that it's
easier to win a case involving questionable conduct than one where the focus is
on, say, a seller's dominant position. Mason, The Current Status of the Mo-
nopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1284-85 (1949).
But the cases themselves also reflect overriding concern with questions of be-
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nected with the financial difficulties experienced by the Item
beginning in 1957. Even if the unit rule had been suppressed it
is extremely doubtful whether the present complexion of the
market would be significantly different than it is. With the
city's only morning paper, a large aggregate circulation nearly
three times that of its competitor, and the savings stemming
from the ability to reproduce copy in both of its papers at de-
clining unit costs, the Times-Picayune Company could simply
offer advertisers substantially more favorable terms than the
Item.9 4
At the core of the entire problem was the company's domi-
nant market position. This was the real subject of concern. Yet
the Justice Department limited its attention to practices that
not only were without adverse competitive impact, but, in any
case, depended for their market effect on the strength, specific-
ally, of the Times-Picayune; in short, the government had flailed
at what it thought were shadows instead of facing up to the sub-
stance of the matter. Perhaps it recognized this in 1958 when
it was confronted with a virtual fait accompli, the Item then in
dire financial straits and about to be purchased by its stronger
rival; the contours of monopoly were then perfectly apparent,
as they should also have been eight years earlier. Looking back
it is clear that so long as the Item had to sustain the entire costs
havior. Why? Two authors give this reason: "At least until more recent years,
the courts were hard on practices which historically had been viewed with dis-
favor; they were comparatively gentle with practices or with situations which
had never been thought immoral, and whose ill effects could be appreciated only
on the basis of economic analysis of a more refined and less well-known sort
than was commonly a party of the courts' intellectual equipment . . . . [C]ourts
are simply not comfortable with economic issues .... .. " KAYSEN & TURNER,
ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 240 (1959). See also
Levi, A Two-Level Anti-Monopoly Law, 47 NW. U.L. REV. 567 (1952), and
Director & Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U.L. REV. 281
(1956). Regardless of the reason, the fact is that the courts and the enforcement
authorities have accorded conduct most of their attention; actually, though, the
maintenance and restoration of competitive markets frequently requires basic
structural reorganization. KAYSEN & TURNER, supra ch. VIII.
94. Even without the unit rule the company could have seriously disadvantaged
the Item by simply having offered national advertisers optional combination rates
representing substantial discounts- perhaps 20 to 25% below the sum of the
separate rates for the two papers it published. (It pursued exactly such a
policy in the case of retail advertising, where the effect on the Item was re-
garded as particularly serious by Item executives even though no ingredient of
compulsion was present.) While this probably would not have been as profitable
from the company's standpoint, it would have induced many advertisers to place
their afternoon copy in the States rather than the Item. That this technique-
offering large discounts on an optional basis-might have greatly aided the
company in any struggle with a rival, see note 89 supra. Its joint printing op-
erations afforded the company great power, which it could have exercised even
without the unit rule.
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of its own publication, including the operation of its printing
facilities, it could not survive unless the multiple economic ad-
vantages possessed by the Times-Picayune were sharply reduced.
To consider further the practicability of having sought to
achieve conditions that might have permitted competition to
continue in New Orleans requires, initially, a brief review of
the basic economic characteristics of contemporary newspaper
publication in the United States. In this survey three principal
attributes deserve emphasis. First, the bulk of newspaper reve-
nue comes from advertising and as a consequence it is a news-
paper's appeal to advertisers, only secondarily to readers, that is
crucial 5 And most advertisers are primarily attracted by the
number of readers (or viewers) they can obtain per unit of ex-
penditure. Due to this propensity a marked differential in the
milline rate (the advertising rate adjusted for circulation) be-
tween competing papers can mean, not just more advertising
in one than the other, but the death of the less popular organ; it
succumbs from economic starvation. Second, from the produc-
tion standpoint a very large proportion of a newspaper's costs
are incurred in getting copy ready to be printed - i.e., the typo-
graphical and composition operations. Once plates are ready
for the press it makes little difference whether, say, 50,000
copies are printed or 100,000. Some incremental costs do arise,
of course, for newsprint, ink, and press time, but these are not
great. Accordingly, as a paper's output increases total costs rise
but not nearly so rapidly as circulation; reflecting this, advertis-
ing charges increase with circulation but not proportionately so
with the result that the rate adjusted for circulation is usually
much lower for a paper of large distribution than another paper
of smaller circulation. The New Orleans experience is illustra-
tive. During the 1950-1958 period the difference in the milline
rates between the Item and the Times-Picayune/States gradual-
ly widened and eventually became so great that the former per-
ished from a lack of advertising revenue. Obviously, then, the
relevant technological and economic factors present one of the
95. Currently a "medium city daily newspaper" obtains 75% of its revenue
from advertising, with most of this in the retail category (which supplies 54%
of such a paper's total revenue). Editor & Publisher, Apr. 6, 1963, p. 15. As
a result, not surprisingly, advertising accounts for most of a newspaper's space,
about 60% (in 1940 the comparable figure was only 40%). Not all of the rest
of an average paper consists of news. Much of what passes for "news" is pre-
packaged filler. "[R]eal news occupies an average of only 38 per cent of non-
advertising space in big city dailies, or 15 per cent of the whole paper. In some
papers hard news is only one page in 24." Bagdikian, Why Dailies Die, TnE
NEW REPUBLIC, April 16, 1962, p. 17, at p. 23.
1964]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
most serious impediments to the survival of newspaper competi-
tion, particularly where the participants are so heavily depen-
dent on advertising as a source of revenue. Third, for most
newspapers circulation is largely confined to the immediate
metropolitan region. The chances of expanding sales by broad-
ening the area of distribution are generally not favorable, both
because of the parochial content of the typical paper and be-
cause of assorted transportation problems.9 6 Hence a newspa-
per's potential circulation is basically a factor of the population
of the community in which it is located (with perhaps some ad-
justment for the varying propensity of people to read newspa-
pers, a factor which changes from country to country and, less
so, from city to city).
With a summary of the relevant economic characteristics
before us we can turn to an examination of the circumstances
of newspaper publication in major American cities. This can
give us a clue as to whether it was reasonable to expect news-
paper competition in New Orleans at all and, if so, what degree
of competition and under what conditions. Table 1 presents
some of the more pertinent information for the nation's 35 larg-
est cities. Not surprisingly, it suggests a strong correlation be-
tween the size of the local market, expressed in terms of popu-
lation, and the presence of more than a single publisher. Al-
though the 11 largest cities each have at least two independent
papers, as population declines monopolistic publication becomes
increasingly common. To cite data which are not entirely re-
flected in the tables,97 of the 16 cities with a population between
500,000 and 1 million, 12 have two or more local publishers; but
of the 21 cities with a population of 300,000 - 500,000, only eight
are competitive; and of the 19 in the 200,000 - 300,000 category
only four have two publishers. As population declines still
further the chances of competition fall sharply: of 69 cities with
96. The New York Times does a highly commendable job of circulating its
paper around the country. The New York early edition is, for example, available
for morning delivery on the day of publication in Dallas. However, rapid, wide-
spread distribution of this sort is feasible only in large cities with direct air
connections to the point of publication. More importantly, few papers have the
broad national and international orientation that makes substantial sale in a
number of cities reasonable. How many people in New Orleans, for example,
would be interested in reading a Boston or Detroit or San Francisco paper; or
vice versa. For most, though not quite all, newspapers the potential market is
close to home.
97. All of this information is based on an analysis of the 1963 E&P YEAR
BooK, with appropriate cross references to the UNITED STATES DEP'T COMMERCE,
1963 STATIsTICAL ABSTRACT (84th ed.).
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population of 100,000 - 200,000, all but 13 are monopolized by a
single publisher and of the 633 cities in the 25,000 - 100,000
category, in only 14 do you find more than one independently
published daily paper. Likewise, even if the scale of the respec-
tive metropolitan areas is considered, rather than just that of
the core city itself, 24 of the 58 competitive communities are
found to lie within the largest 35 standard metropolitan regions.
While a precise line cannot be drawn, it is evident from a
careful look at Table 2 that as the population of a metropolitan
area falls below approximately 650,000, newspaper competition
is so rare as to be regarded as accidental or the product of
unique forces (e.g., owners who for the sake of maintaining
editorial independence, forego the economic advantages of sale
or consolidation). Beneath this mark, potential circulation
seems insufficient to support two publishers, at least if each
must own and operate its printing plant. It does appear, how-
ever, that if two competing publishers can share one plant, di-
viding the investment and realizing the considerable benefits
involved in not having to set identical copy twice (just as if the
two papers were under a single ownership advertisements, in
this situation, for example, can be readied for the press and run
in each paper without further typographical effort), competi-
tion can be perpetuated in cities otherwise too small. Of the 18
cities with a population ranging from 100,000 to 350,000 that
have two independent daily papers, in 10 there is some sort of
joint printing arrangement with one plant serving both publica-
tions.98 This is even true of a few cities whose metropolitan areas
contain less than 300,000 residents, as with Lincoln, Nebraska
(with a 1960 metropolitan area population of 155,272) ; Evans-
ville, Indiana (199,313) ; Fort Wayne, Indiana (232,196) ; and
Shreveport, Louisiana (281,481). 99 Based on such other infor-
98. There are two common types of joint printing arrangements. In some
cases, as in Pittsburgh or Birmingham, one paper simply performs the function
for the other under contract. In a number of cities, like Fort Wayne and
Shreveport, the printing (and usually also some related operations, such as dis-
tribution, and frequently the whole range of business chores) is done by a sep-
arate corporation in which the competing papers hold stock, commonly on a
50-50 basis. These two forms account for virtually all of the joint printing
situations. A further problem should be noted. Where the two papers have such
an arrangement and work together closely in conducting their business affairs
they may, in fact, lose their editorial independence; i.e., though on the face of
it they are sovereign, in actuality they are not. One suspects that this is often
the case, but to justify such a conclusion would require access to information
which is not publicly available.
99. Among other joint printing cities are St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Tulsa, El
Paso, Salt Lake City, Nashville, and Chattanooga.
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mation as is available it is most improbable that these cities
could sustain two papers if it were not for cooperative printing.
With or without a joint printing arrangement a city's popu-
lation basically determines whether newspaper competition can
exist. Where a metropolitan area has fewer than 650,000 resi-
dents, or thereabouts, the chances of finding a monopolized
press are greatly magnified. To appreciate the matter fully,
however, another factor must be taken into account for it is not
just population that is important but the division of circulation
between rival papers (more accurately, their publishers). If one
publisher gains a sufficiently large lead in circulation, the
underlying economics of the situation normally cause so marked
a diversion of advertising to the stronger paper that the other's
life blood, advertising revenue, is choked off. Where this point
occurs cannot be exactly determined, but columns 7 and 8 of
Table 1 indicate that it is rare for the bigger paper in a city to
have more than twice its competitor's circulation.') There are
a few exceptons, but they present special situations. The Phoenix
Journal, first published in 1962, closed down in January 1963
when the government seized its plant for nonpayment of a tax
lien, but reopened on August 21, 1963, under a new publisher; its
chances of survival are problematical. In Fort Worth and In-
dianapolis the weaker dailies are felt within the trade merely
to be tolerated, preserved as symbols of competition by far more
powerful opponents; perhaps one further reason for their sur-
vival is that they are links in the Scripps-Howard chain, pos-
sibly, therefore, having somewhat lower overhead costs and, in
any case, probably receiving a de facto subsidy from the parent
organization. Rather than represent a deviation from the prin-
ciple suggested, the New York City experience may illustrate
its operation. On October 16, 1963, the Mirror ceased publica-
tion, in spite of its 835,000 circulation, the second largest in the
country. Why? Probably because the advertising fraternity
viewed the Mirror and the Daily News, both tabloids, as in a
category of their own, and one, it should be noted, in which the
100. Laurence Scott of the Manchester Guardian says that "the minimum
viable circulation of any newspaper" is "at least half the sale (circulation) of
its most successful direct competitor." Economist, Sept. 8, 1962, p. 877. In most
cases this will mean the city's other paper. In cities where there are three or
more papers a question can Be raised as to the accuracy of Mr. Scott's rule of
thumb; here a paper may be able to survive if it doesn't slip too far behind the
group's average circulation (see Table 1).
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News circulation had reached a point where it was more than
double that of the deceased.''
While, in summary, these comments do not necessarily ex-
plain each of the deviant situations, generally it appears that in
market areas with a population of less than 650,000 local daily
newspaper competition cannot be expected unless the publishers
agree upon some sort of joint printing arrangement, in which
case the mark can be shoved down, perhaps as low as 200,000.
Above the 650,000 line competition can exist, at least so long as
one publisher does not gain a circulation too much greater-
roughly double- than that of his protagonist. And as a city's
population increases three or more publishers may survive, sub-
ject to the same qualification concerning the need for approxi-
mate equality of circulation.
The implications of this analysis for the New Orleans situa-
tion should by now be manifest. Although the city, with a met-
ropolitan population in 1960 of 868,000, would appear to be
large enough to sustain two competing publishers, it could not
do so where (as of 1958) the Times-Picayune Company had
achieved a total daily circulation of nearly 300,000, three times
that of the Item. With such a commanding lead (without equiv-
alent at the moment, as columns 7 and 8 of Table 1 indicate,
except in cities where the weaker paper is generally acknowl-
edged to be on thin ice or is specially situated, as in Phoenix),
the Item's demise should not have been surprising. It was in-
evitable - unless, that is, steps had been taken to achieve funda-
mental structural modification. Accorded the right treatment it
seems possible that two separately edited and published, but not
necessarily independently printed, daily newspapers could have
subsisted in New Orleans.
Before considering what might have been done to render the
New Orleans environment more conducive to newspaper com-
101. And as the Mirror lost circulation ground to the News its advertising
linage also declined. For the period April through September 1963 as compared
with the same period in 1962 the Mirror's advertising linage fell by more than
641,000 lines (equal to almost 10% of its linage in 1962). Reflecting the impact
of the protracted New York City strike the News also lost linage, but an amount
equal to only about 5% of its 1962 figure. N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1963, p. 1, col. 2,
and p. 31, col. 1 (city ed.) ; N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1963, p. 34, col. 6 (city ed.).
Also see Paneth, What Killed 'The Mirror,' 197 TIE NATION 291 (Nov. 9,
1963). A related case is presented by the sale of the Houston Press, a tabloid, to
the rival Chronicle in March 1964. Both evening papers, the Press' circulation
had fallen to 87,000 (as of September 30, 1963), or less than half that of the
Chroncile's 207,000.
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petition, it is well to reemphasize that the Times-Picayune Com-
pany had come to occupy its "bottleneck" position through af-
firmative action. While by 1958 it had secured a monopoly of
the city's newspaper publication, this had not been "thrust
upon" it. In his now classic opinion in the Alcoa case Judge
Learned Hand noted that there may be instances in which some-
one gains a monopoly "merely by virtue of his superior skill,
foresight and industry.' 1 °2 However, after scrutinizing the
facts Judge Hand concluded that Alcoa was not "the passive
beneficiary of a monopoly, following upon an involuntary elimi-
nation of competitors by automatically operative economic
forces," but rather had embraced each new opportunity to bol-
ster its dominant position. 1 3 The same interpretation was taken
by Judge Wyzanski in his United Shoe Machinery opinion, where
he found that the defendant had gained and perpetuated its con-
trol through the erection of artificial barriers to competition.
0 4
The Times-Picayune situation fits neatly into this pattern. To a
considerable extent the decline of newspaper competition notice-
able in the city over the last half century stemmed from inher-
ent economic forces over which the company had no control. But
its survival is not entirely the product of external circum-
stances. Its purchase of the States in 1933, its tacit understand-
ing with International Paper concerning the closing of the Sun-
day Item in 1941, and its attempt to "slow down" the Item in
1950 through adoption of the unit rule (however unsuccessful
this tactic turned out to be, it represented an effort to use the
power it held to disadvantage a lone rival), all constitute evi-
dence of the Times-Picayune Company's efforts to secure a mo-
nopoly. To attribute its position solely to inexorable market
forces is to be ignorant of its history. Quite conceivably monop-
oly may be thrust upon a newspaper ;105 but this company can-
not fairly claim that justification.
102. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir.
1945).
103. Id. at 430. One of the reasons given by the court for reaching this con-
clusion was its finding that Alcoa had constantly anticipated increases in the
demand for its product and confronted every newcomer with news capacity al-
ready geared into its firmly-entrenched organization. An analogy can be drawn
to the Times-Picayune situation.
104. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 344
(D. Mass. 1953). Although acknowledging United Shoe's considerable "skill,
foresight and industry," Judge Wyzanski added that the company's control "does
not rest solely on its original constitution, its ability, its research, or its economies
of scale. There are other barriers to competition, and these barriers were erected
by United's own business policies." Id. at 344.
105. For illustrations see United States v. Harte-Hanks Newspapers, Inc.,
170 F. Supp. 227, 229 (N.D. Tex. 1959) ; Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of
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On the assumption that an antitrust violation could, and
should, have been found in the New Orleans case, a relief pre-
scription had to be written that would loosen the grip of the
Times-Picayune and give competition a chance to succeed. Sev-
eral remedies could be mentioned. Dissolution, for one, could
have been decreed, but under the circumstances this was inap-
propriate. The company's conduct was not so tainted with
wrong or so deeply rooted in illicit motivation as to warrant its
destruction. Instead the formulation of relief called for a more
refined approach. Essentially it required recognition that, given
the Times-Picayune Company's substantial circulation, no other
publisher could survive if he had to operate a fully integrated
operation. This fact suggests, then, that the economically most
efficient answer lay in compelling the company to share its
printing facilities with a competing paper. Of necessity this
would also have demanded a division of the hours of operation;
the Times-Picayune might have been allowed to keep its solitary
grasp on the morning field with the afternoon segment being
consigned to another publisher who would carry out his editorial
function on a completely separate basis but contribute to the
costs of the common printing facility. 10 6
While initial reaction to this plan might characterize it as
radical, in fact it has respectable judicial precedent. In 1912, as
a prime example, the Supreme Court required the Terminal
Railroad Association of St. Louis to permit non-member rail-
roads to use its facilities after finding that they provided the
only access to the city's main terminal. 10 7 Later, in 1945, the
Court approved a decree which had the effect of compelling the
Associated Press to admit as members newspapers which were
New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125, 142 (D. Mass. 1959), afI'd a3 modified,
284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961). In the former
case the court appears to have concluded that the town of Greenville, Texas
(population: 17,000) was not big enough to sustain two daily papers. In the
latter Judge Wyzanski seems to have reached the same conclusion as respects
Haverhill, Massachusetts (population: 46,346).
106. The details of such an undertaking would have to be worked out,
naturally; but models are readily at hand for precisely this sort of arrangement,
in which one paper prints a competitor's paper. An arrangement like this is in
use in several cities of substantial size (Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and Birmingham,
to mention three). Either the Times-Picayune Company could have printed the
Item's editions under a contract whose terms would have been subject to court
approval, or the printing and associated activities could have been placed in a
separate company whose ownership the two papers could have shared. In either
case the Item, over a period of time, could have been required to make a capital
contribution to the Times-Picayune Company sufficient to offset a portion of
the investment involved.
107. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
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in competition with established papers.0 8 Other decisions, com-
ing in the wake of the 1948 Griffith decision,0 9 also demon-
strate the courts' willingness to pry open bottleneck positions
where this is economically necessary if competition is to pre-
vail. 110 Thus there is nothing particularly revolutionary about
the suggestion advanced here concerning the New Orleans case.
Court-decreed joint printing was both legally and economically
feasible and would have created conditions distinctly favorable
to the preservation of newspaper competition by curtailing the
Times-Picayune's position and accomplishing a sharing of costs
that would have been advantageous to both papers. Under these
circumstances the probabilities that another publisher might
have taken over the Item and been able to keep it alive were
most encouraging. Given the vital social significance of news-
papers - after all, we are not dealing here with sausage fac-
tories - every effort should have been exerted to attain a com-
petitive market in New Orleans, even if it meant only the addi-
tion of a single publisher. The value of a second paper is sub-
stantial whether it takes a sharply contrasting point of view on
major public issues or whether it only reflects a modestly dif-
ferent selection of news and expression of opinion. "The real
danger" in newspaper monopoly, as the 1962 British Royal Re-
port on the Press put it, does "not lie in the active propagation
of one-sided views, but in the conscious or unconscious suppres-
sion of shades of opinion which ought to have a voice.""'
108. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
109. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
110. In one case a court found that a trade association, which controlled
tobacco warehouse sales in the Danville, Virginia, area, had violated the Sherman
Act by denying the plaintiff membership in the association. The plaintiff was
given both injunctive relief (which effectively meant that it had to be admitted to
the association) and damages. American Federation of Tobacco Growers v.
Neal, 183 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1950). For a comparable case decided by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, see Marlboro Tobacco Board of Trade, 48 F.T.C. 269
(1951). See also Gameo, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., 194 F.2d
484 (1st Cir. 1952).
111. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE PRESS 19 (1962) (herein-
after cited as 1962 BRITISH PRESS REPORT). The Report recognized that "there
is a special public interest involved in the Press that is not present in industry
at large. In amalgamations in most other industries no question normally arises
of any power to influence public manners or political opinions." Id. at 21.
Commenting on the sale of the New York Mirror (note 101 supra) former Vice
President Nixon said, "this is something that is not just an economic problem.
It is a problem of vital concern to the public. The public should think about
what it means if we have . . . only one morning paper and one evening paper
in big cities." N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1963, p. 19, col. 5 (city ed.). A. J. Liebling
has put the matter crisply: "A city with one newspaper, or with a morning and
evening paper under one ownership, is like a man with one eye, and often the eye
is glass." LIEBLINO, THE PRESS 29 (1961).
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Imaginatively and vigorously implemented, the antitrust
laws can help to maintain, or restore, newspaper competition in
a number of major American cities that are sufficiently large
to support at least two independent publishers. New Orleans is
merely one example. In bigger cities, where more than two pub-
lishers can subsist, there is likewise no good reason to tolerate
consolidations that needlessly remove an autonomous voice from
the community. Cities like Chicago and Detroit are sizable
enough to sustain three or four publishers, certainly if joint
printing arrangements are put into effect like those which are
in use in such other cities as St. Louis and Pittsburgh. Regret-
tably, however, a review of recent experience shows that the
government failed to act to block amalgamations of such papers
as the Detroit News and the Times, the Chicago Tribune and
the American, and the Chicago Daily News and the Sun-
Times.112 In each of these instances where it was asserted the
Justice Department accepted the contention of the acquiring
concern that the seller was in "failing" circumstances and that,
therefore, sale was unavoidable. 1"3 Whether this claim was true
112. In each instance mentioned in the text the purchaser paid a whopping
price for a competing paper that supposedly was on the verge of bankruptcy (if
so, why not let it fail?) and whose physical assets were usually unappealing and
unwanted (the plant formerly occupied by the Item stood vacant for four years
before it was finally sold to a hotel). In each case the buyer's most valuable
acquisition was negative in character, namely the effective elimination of a com-
petitor and the creation of circumstances that made entry by a new publisher
virtually impossible. With the deceased paper's plant owned by the buyer
(whether it stood idle or, in a rare instance, was put to use), with the old print-
ing equipment sold piecemeal or for scrap, and with experienced newspaper execu-
tives from the purchased paper covered by restrictive covenants (see note 42
supra), the probabilities that a new publisher can enter are nil. For this assur-
ance the buyer pays a very high price. In Detroit, for example, the News re-
portedly paid $10 million for the Times. And in New Orleans the Times-Picayune
Company paid $3.4 million for physical assets it did not need. In both instances,
and in other similar cases, one is entitled to conclude that the amounts paid
went for an intangible not explicitly incorporated in the agreement of sale:
monopoly or the acquisition of a dominant market position.
113. The "failing firm" defense is usually said to shield a purchaser that
acquires a competing firm "with resources so depleted and the prospect of re-
habilitation so remote that it faced the grave probability of a business failure
... " International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 U.S. 291, 302
(1930). Several aspects of the defense, however, remain to be defined. First, is
it available where an arrangement could have been worked out, with an appro-
priate change in conditions, that might reasonably have enabled the "failing" firm
to have survived? This point was raised but not resolved in the International
Shoe decision. Id. at 301 (on the record before it the Court dismissed the possi-
bility of recovery as "speculative"). Second, the Court clearly stated that the
defense is not available where the acquisition is made "with a purpose to lessen
competition." Id. at 302. Although there has been no amplification of this issue,
seemingly it would cover a case in which a publisher buys out a "failing" rival
and pays such a high price that an intention to gain a monopoly, or to bolster
a position, may fairly be inferred (see note 112 supra). Third, if another buyer
might be found (or is available) and sale of the property to such a purchaser
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or not" 4 is beside the point; action should still have been taken
to prevent consummation of the mergers indicated. This might
have induced (or forced) the publishers involved to have de-
vised some form of joint printing scheme that would have en-
abled both to continue in business as truly independent con-
cerns. 115 It was entirely possible in Chicago, for example, that
the Tribune and American, and the Daily News and Sun-Times,
could, respectively, have agreed to share a common printing
plant without also consolidating under single ownerships their
entire publishing and editorial operations. In Detroit the prob-
lem presented by the 1960 merger of the News and the Times
was more difficult since both were competing evening papers
and accordingly could not share one plant. However, if the gov-
ernment had indicated it would object the Times might, for in-
stance, have been able to agree on an arrangement with the Free
Press, the city's (and Michigan's) only morning paper, in which
the latter would have printed the Times under contract (as is
done now in a number of other cities), permitting the two pa-
pers to share the economies of joint publication. While there
can be no absolute assurance that in the cases mentioned (and
in others like them) antitrust intervention would have preserved
would not lessen competition at all or would do so but to a lesser extent than
sale to another buyer, can the latter raise the "failing firm" defense? The Inter-
national Shoe opinion strongly suggests that he may not be able to. Id. at 302.
This question has distinct relevance to the newspaper situation. Commonly a
competing paper is willing to pay far more for a rival paper (in order to remove
it from the market) than would someone interested in continuing the paper in
operation. Sale to the latter would not reduce competition, whereas sale to the
former would. From a policy standpoint it would make sense to deny the defense
to the former and in this way induce sale to the one who would keep the paper
going, even though the seller would receive less money as a result. See United
States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654 (1962). On the "failing firm" defense generally,
see Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics,
74 HARV. L. REv. 226, 339-47 (1960).
114. At the time the Detroit News bought the Times in 1960 the seller claimed
that its paper had lost $10 million during the preceding five years. Union nego-
tiators, however, say that in 1958 the Times management cited figures showing
that the paper made a profit at least through 1957. UAW SOLIDARITY, Nov. 18,
1960, p. 6. The opportunities for withdrawing liquid assets or juggling books are
so great that it can :be extremely difficult to tell whether a newspaper has actual-
ly been losing money. Indeed there are people in New Orleans who had been asso-
ciated with the Item who claim that it was not really sustaining a deficit at the
time of sale, even though this was the impression given to the public. It should
be borne in mind that the seller may be quite anxious to complete the transaction;
the purchase price is usually high and any gain realized is taxable at favorable
capital gains rates; under these conditions the public interest in preserving com-
petition is likely to be forgotten.
115. Since a legitimate question can be raised as to the applicability in these
cases of the "failing firm" defense (see note 113 supra) the assurance of gov-
ernment action to block the merger might well have caused the parties, in each
of the cases mentioned, to have devised an acceptable cooperative printing ar-
rangement. Or the buyer might suddenly have found that failure was not as
imminent as it had been represented to be.
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an independent competitor, the probabilities are great that the
loss of several papers could have been prevented, surely an
ample reward. Yet at the time many major newspaper mergers
were announced in recent years the government chose not to
act. In doing so it was unwise. But it can still act - and it
should, wherever constructive relief can still be obtained. 116
Furthermore, in the future it should be ready to intervene
promptly in similar merger situations; for, if judiciously and
imaginatively enforced, the antitrust laws can serve a useful
function in preserving, and in expanding, the limited competi-
tion that exists in newspaper publication in our largest cities.
In saying that the federal antitrust laws can play a bene-
ficial role in safeguarding local newspaper competition in the
United States, one should not overlook their obvious limitations.
However diligently enforced they cannot reach all the cases that
are worthy of attention for without any improper conduct on
the part of a competitor and without any form of amalgamation,
a newspaper may simply cease publication and leave its city
with a monopoly publisher. In most cities this can be expected
to happen, if it has not already taken place; only a very few
communities are big enough, given present conditions, to sup-
port more than one paper, and of those that can sustain competi-
tion, in most this will mean just two publishers. Under these
circumstances antitrust intervention can help only occasionally
(though the importance of these instances cannot be underesti-
mated) .1 1  Thus if local newspaper competition is desirable, a
116. As the General Motors-du Pont experience demonstrates, the government
may bring a section 7 case at any time after a merger has been consummated.
United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). The
more difficult question is whether effective relief can be achieved in view of the
passage of time. In many of the newspaper cases an affirmative answer is indi-
cated. In Chicago, for example, the Sun-Times and the Daily News, and the
Tribune and the American, each employ one printing plant. All that would be
required here would be to divide each combine into two pieces, ending up with
four independently owned, edited, and published newspapers printed in two plants.
Of course, in all these cases it would be necessary to find a publisher or pub-
lishers to take over the newly freed papers. But given the fact that the new
owner would not have to make an initial investment in printing equipment and
could, under court guidance, acquire the property on an installment-purchase
plan, the venture would be an attractive one to many investors.
117. Consideration might well be given to legislation which would apply a
special and more rigorous standard to newspaper mergers than to most other
forms of business consolidation. The 1962 BRITIsH PRESS REPORT (note 111), for
instance, recommended that all future acquisitions of newspapers by concerns
having aggregate weekly circulations exceeding three million copies, either before
or after the purchase, "should be submitted to the jurisdiction of a (proposed)
Press Amalgamations Court; and that the Court should consent only if it is
established by means of statutory criteria that the transaction is not contrary to
the public interest." Id. at 103-11 and appendix XV.
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TABLE 2. CIRCUMSTANCES OF DAILY NEWSPAPER PUBLICATION
IN STANDARD METROPOLITAN AREAS WITH 1960 POPULATION
OF 300,000 - 1,000,000
STANDARD
METROPOLITAN
AREA
Miami
Denver
New Orleans
Portland, Ore.
Providence
Tampa - St. Petersburg
Louisville
Indianapolis
Dayton
San Antonio
Columbus
Phoenix
Albany - Schec. - Troy
San Jose
Memphis
Jersey City
Rochester, N. Y.
Norfolk
Gary
Fort Worth
Syracuse
Akron
Oklahoma City
Youngstown
Sacramento
Allentown
Springfield, Mass.
Omaha
Toledo
Jacksonville
Nashville
Flint
S. M.A.
RANK
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
S. M.A.
PoPULATIoN
(in thousands)
935
929
868
822
816
772
725
698
694
687
683
664
658
642
627
611
586
579
574
573
564
516
512
509
503
492
479
458
457
455
400
374
*The figure in this column indicates the number of firms which publish a daily
newspaper of general circulation within the given metropolitan area.
bTwo daily papers are published in St. Petersburg (by the same owner since
1962), one in Tampa. Both cities fall within the same standard metropolitan
area. The papers tend to confine their coverage to the affairs of their respective
cities.
*Albany and Troy each have a single local publisher; Schenectady has two.
The three cities form a single metropolitan area.
dSpringfield and Holyoke each have a daily paper. Along with Chicopee they
compose a single metropolitan area.
NuMBER
OF DAILY
NEWSPAPER
PUBLISHERS
IN AREA'
2
2
1
1
1
2b
1
2
1
2
2
1
4c
11
1
1
1
1
2
11
1
1
2
1
2d
1
1
1
2
1
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Knoxville 56 368 1
Wilmington 57 366 1
Fresno 58 366 1
Grand Rapids 59 363 1
Wilkes-Barre 60 347 1
Wichita 61 343 1
Canton 62 340 1
Bridgeport 63 335 1
Utica - Rome 64 331 2e
Worcester 65 323 1
Tacoma 66 322 1
Mobile 67 314 1
El Paso 68 314 1
New Haven 69 312 1
'Utica and Rome have dailies of their own, and together form a common
metropolitan area.
NOTE: Between them tables 1 and 2 contain information on the country's
69 largest standard metropolitan areas, with the single exception of Paterson-
Clifton-Passaic, New Jersey.
Sources: Table 1; Editor & Publisher, 1963 International Year Book; Statis-
tical Abstract of the United States, 1963, at 13-18.
broader-based, more flexible approach to the entire problem is
needed. Specifically, techniques must be devised that will lessen
the impact of the present heavy reliance on advertising as a
source of revenue (conceivably this might be done with pro-
gressive tax levies on advertising revenue that would tend to
reduce sharply the advantages now held by papers of large cir-
culation) 118 and that will generate new sources of financial sup-
port (perhaps taking the form, not merely of higher prices
charged subscribers, but of assistance provided by foundations,
diverse economic interest groups, political parties, and maybe
even the government).
Admittedly, some of these ideas are highly unique within the
context of American political and economic thought, but unless
steps of this sort are taken promptly the powerful economic
forces at work in the industry are certain to retard competition
still more. At best we may soon find ourselves with a few na-
tionally-distributed and nationally and internationally-oriented
newspapers, backstopped by a thoroughly monopolized local
118. Various notions of this sort were considered in the 1962 BRITISH PRESS
REPORT, id. at 91-99. One called for a statutory restriction on the proportion of
space that could be devoted to advertising; another proposed a levy on advertis-
ing revenue which would be imposed at a percentage rate which would rise with
the newspaper's circulation; a third called for an excise duty on any newspaper's
advertising revenue where this exceeded a stated figure (two million pounds) a
year. For a further expression by a member of the Royal Commission, see Redda-
way, The Economics of Newspapers, 73 ECONOMIC JOURNAL 201 (1963).
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press." 9 Even if residents of most of the country's larger cities
ultimately were able to buy the New York Times or any of a
number of other high-quality papers on the day of publication
as easily as their local daily, in some ways an appealing thought,
it is undesirable and unwise to acquiesce in a situation which
increasingly places responsibility for informing the people as
to municipal and regional affairs in the hands of monopolistic
publishers. Some significant degree of local newspaper com-
petition is attainable if we are prepared now to take the appro-.
priate corrective measures.
119. Some may regard even this as an overly optimistic prognostication, in
view of the recent experience with the western editions of the New York Times.
With much of the copy transmitted by wire from New York the Times published
a western edition at Los Angeles from October 1, 1962 until January 24, 1964,
when the operation was discontinued. The paper's management reported heavy
losses due to high costs and a failure of advertising to develop in the necessary
volume. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1964, p. 1, col. 1 (city ed.) (For additional back-
ground on the western edition, see Tebbel, The New York Times Goes West,
Saturday Review, Nov. 11, 1961, p. 69.) However, the success achieved by the
Wall Street Journal with its publication of a number of regional editions sug-
gests that the Times' experience need not be controlling. The odds still are great
that at least one truly comprehensive, nationally-oriented daily paper will at
some future date be printed and distributed simultaneously from several printing
plants located throughout the country. Technologically there is no problem,
given the ease of transmission of copy by wire and the marvels of automatic
typesetting. See Severo, Automation and the News Strike, The Reporter, March
14, 1963, p. 29.
